From the world to the world of life: an itinerary toward daily life and communication[1]

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Abstract

The world of life is a concept corresponding to a philosophic construction, which opens the discussion toward daily life, and communication. While science has centered in the large action and thought systems, daily life is re-discovered as the space where the individual dialectic, mindful and actively responds to the social system. This article embraces the first part of theoretic framework of the qualitative research with hermeneutic approach Daily Aesthetics and literature in search of configuring, an everyday aesthetics, parting from the study of literature at Schools of Communication

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Key words: everyday aesthetics, daily life, life world, literary studies.

The concept of world

The various uses of the word "world" threats its comprehension. We find, however, that fundamentals of the concept of this word is, at least for various centuries of thought, in Philosophy, and a first antecedent of the concept "world" concretely appears in Platonic philosophy. Platon's philosophy is entirely a philosophy that struggles between antagonist pairs. This is a consequence from dialectics, in its idea that the contrary ones are positive/negative synthesis of the other (Garcia, 2002; Droz, 1995). In fact, texts where this philosophy was shaped are written as dialogues; this figure perfectly shows us that sensation of flowing, going back and forth, where we see that Socrates[1] questions various individuals on different topics.

In these dialogues ideas are not exposed, as in a treaty, on a sequential, arranged and linear manner. In a treaty there is structure, a pattern, an expositive arrangement previously planned; otherwise, in daily life conversations there is no such planning, since conversation proposes its own drifts and rhythm. And notwithstanding Platonic dialogues are written, and notwithstanding there may be doubts as whether they happened, letter by letter, as transcribed, they keep a good part of such spontaneity, underlined in the fact that the reader attends the process of how ideas surge through the same conversation, and consolidate by intervention of the fellow[2].

And perhaps it is a paradox of the same dialectics, but effort used by Platon to hoist the reason as a maximum value, in criticizing beliefs in gods, and faith in myths, is the one leading one of his most important contributions to philosophy is shaped, just in a myth.

The myth of the cavern talks of a situation of some beings who for their whole life lived in profundities of the earth, prisoner, and who before their eyes find moving figures. Just until the time when one prisoner is released, he sees that such figures they took as real, were not other things but projections of shadow produced by fire. Releasing is the time of ascending, getting out to free air, and see that there is much more intense light (and endless), than the one inside the cavern. This is Platon's message in The Republic. (1979).

1.There is objective evidence that an individual named Socrates existed. Where there is no full certainty is whether his words, reproduced in dialogues written by Platon, are exact to those that this individual said in the real life. However, those studying his work, parting from stylometric techniques and reference crossing, have agreed that there are serveral periods of time in works of this thinker, where intensity of influx of their master is demonstrable, in terms of when he thinks of identification with himself and how, in his last texts, he separates. For purposes of this work, it is not pertinent to perform such exposition of taxonomy of the works. It is enough to say that The Republic, a work that we briefly comment below, belongs to the stage of maturity, where he develops important ideas on theory of knowledge, and concern about ethics, and moral which is less imporant than previously.

2. It is not free that in most dialogues speakers are walking, along the river, or the square.

The myth of the cavern is neither The Republic (the book containing it), nor Platon. But they synthesize much of his thought[3]. In essence, because if we see the text in a topologic key, we will find three levels: depth of the cavern, land level, and the sky. These three levels are a metaphor of knowledge levels expressed by Platon in his theories. In fact, for this thinker, all of us have opinions (in Greek the root is doxa), that would be the wall shadows, which vary according to our poor condition, but are not true. This would be the lowest and distrustable level of knowledge, that, - in addition- is not precisely knowledge.

Upon leaving the cavern, however, the prisoner recognizes objects, trees, and reflex of things in water. These would be the ideas: concrete manifestations. Finally, the prisoner recognizes the sun, endless source of energy. And that is the unattainable world of eternity, where things are in themselves. As derived from the above, the dangerous thing of the idea of thinking lies in that we may never reach things, which are endless and do not admit any qualification, but to expressions of them in the form of ideas. Ideas are the intermediation between the sky, (the symbol used in the dialogue is the sun, a source of good), and the doxa that is, the opinion, the perception that we –trapped in the cavern, manage to form about things.

In summary, this communication suggests that there are two worlds. The *sensible world,* the one we may immediately reach through senses, and the *world of ideas.* Thus, while in the world of ideas there are things in themselves, pure, non-contaminated, the mundane world, anchored to the sensible, may just access representations of the first. In Platonic structure of knowledge, the body is *jail of the soul* as it ties us to the present, to finitude, the here and the now, while the soul is the eternity dose belonging to us, or better, is how we connect to eternity of the being. The expression "jail" very well summarizes how Plato sees this situation: we may never reach concepts of beautifulness, love, and justice, the center of his thought, because we are tied to a body that prevents us from transcending. The task of philosophy is to make us see less in appearances, but in essences. Therefore, Philosophy finds in Platon a decisive spur in its task of searching for universal fundamentals, principles, of things, rather than circumstances, appearances and representations. And that is just the reason that in the ideal *Republic* of Platon, edges do not fit. Because they build works (sculptures, song, poems…) which make us believe, in the sensible world, which *are* beautifulness, when they are just distorted reflex of the unique and real idea of beautifulness that lies in eternity.

The idea of a superiority of essences over appearances or, in other words, the idea that appearances deceive, is founded in Platonic epistemology: from him until the modern project of an objective science, we find an ascending line that tries to put aside what it sees as finite, human, carnal, apparent (Echeverria, 2002).

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3. Talking of a so commented myth drives us to Italo Calvino's in "¿why reading classics?", apoint is gotten where some wind mills, an old horse, and an old armor "are" Don Quijote.

In terms of the idea of world we explore here, it is worth to highlight that Platon established a difference between the order of symbol and the order or reality. Since Platon, at least regarding written philosophy, there is a difference between what we see, and what *it is,* between the concept and its expression, between materiality and inmateriality, between transcendence and intrascendence[4]; a categorization persists, in which everything out of reach is highlighted and, in addition, the firm suspect on what appears before our senses.

Another Platonic dialogue states this difference in linguistic terms, In *Cratilo[5],* there is a discussion on relationship between names and things. There, Platon, argues against those who claim that words create things, that names act as labels we identify objects with, and that between both things not necessarily any identity must exist. Platon refutes them through his theory of reminiscence: preexisting relationship between words and things. In fact, concepts are in individual as they are born, since concepts belong to eternity, they have been and will be for ever.

No questions, this same scheme is reproduced by Saint Agustin, (2003), a thinker very influenced by Platon, who compose that group named the Patristics, a group of thinkers that found epistemologic, anxiologic and political basis of the Catholic Church (Soto, 2010). Not in vain, Platon influence in his ideas on intranscendence of the body, and relevance of the soul are familiar for us since they are fundamental in the discourse of the Catholic Church. Also through the figure of dialogue, in *De Magistro* Augustin defends a Platonic culture of language before *Adeodato,* his son. The example Saint Agustin mentions is canon: we say "tiger" and the tiger jumps to eat us; the word "water" calms us the thirst. (San Agustin, 2003).

However, the words "tiger" and "water" serve to evoke in us other images of things that are not here right now. We understand with words. And we save the effort of pointing everything we want to refer to. Such is the case that, thanks to that division between word and thing we may say "nothing". Agustin points at the paradox: language may mention, even, what does not exist.

Ideas collected in *De Magistro,* as well as the myth of the Cavern and *Cratilo* (Platon 2011), points at a direction where the communicative arises with all of its strength: there are for us things that may be named, although such things that may be named tell us that there are other ones that may not be named. Discussion as whether or not those things exist is long and intense. What are interested in stating is that in such discussion lies one of the most decisive contributions in understanding the relevance communicative dimension in human life: both for things we may name, and for those we may not, cultures create consensus processes. Thus, culture may be understood as an immense network of tacit, and explicit agreements on what is known, and what

4. This same duality is replied by Kant in his idea of phenomenon and the neumenon, by Descartes in his proposal of thought and the extension, and in Saussure in his statement of the meaning and the meaningful, as well as in his idea of the difference between language and speaking.

5. We follow Carlos Garcia Gual's issue: Platon (2011). Dialogues. Grados, Madrid.

is not, and, over all, as Freud stated in *Totem and tabu (1983),* a dynamic complex of agreements on what to do with that thing which may not be named, either because it is forbidden, or because there is no way of mentioning it.

The group of everything which is intelligible, mentionable or not, administered by cultural institutions, and a fundamental part of daily exchange among people, and integral societies, is –in whole, what could be named as the first notion of the word *world.* Whether or not there is consensus, or if dealing with objects or concepts, world is *everything that reaches the horizon of people.* But that possibility for subjects to make sense is crossed by language.

The idea of world that we have found in the referred texts, shows two basic nuances: one is a certain component of dirtiness, close to the concept of *mundane (*Ferrater Mora, 2001), that is, something contaminated, impure, banal, and intrascendent; the other, is related to the language where words keep relationship with other things, whether or not it is accepted that such relationship is pre-existing (as proposed by Platon in Cratilo). The truth is that a duality raises with words, since words are an intermediate between the transcendent world and ideas. Perhaps because of that intermediate place, there is certain skepticism regarding the word, because notwithstanding it may be a means of knowledge, it may also be a distractor.

These conceptions associated to the idea of world continue to exist in many authors. In our analysis, it would be worth to differentiate its contributions regarding its preference or location of that *world of life,* either for the sake of linguistic support, or for corporal vitality. We will talk in a first instance of linguistic trend.

Linguistic-rationalist trend: the world as, what is the case

In this line we find Ludwig Wittgenstein. Questions of the philosopher who found the analytical group of philosophy discuss the notion of world – not the one of world of life, with a clear linguistic and rationalist idea, and with a notable concern on how language interferes with that man-world relationship. According to the place that Wittgenstein assigns to language in man-world relationship, two contrasting philosophies raise, which often makes to talk about the first Wittgenstein and second Wittgenstein, since his posture regarding language is clearly opposed in the two periods of time which analysts classify his work with (Blasco, Grimaltos, and Sanchez, 1999).

What experts coincide in naming *first* Wittgenstein surges from the number of concepts included by the author in *Tractaus logic-philosophicus* (2009. This work is the place where the philosopher develops his theory of philosophy as a matter of logic. The essential thesis states that it is not possible to properly judge about the world in absence of accurate terms to establish such judgment. Thus, within the context of a reflection on language and logic-philosophy, Wittgenstein begins the *Tractatus* through a statement made with the whole sequential structure of a proposition, as the author's style is, which work tries to save words to gain density,

consistence and accuracy of concepts: "1. The world is everything which is the case". He adds: "1.1 the world is the whole events, not things". Then, he holds: "1.13 Events in logic space are the world". Ending his work, Wittgenstein concludes: "7. on which is not possible to talk, it is better to keep silent" (Wittgenstein, 2009).

In 1. *Which is the case,* is what may enter into our existential dominion; something *is the case*, when we may imbue, or at least learn about, of that case. Therefore, in 1.1. the idea of what is the case is related to events. When rejecting things the consequence is not that objects themselves do not fit in the world. Rather, it is a matter of stating that those objects turn to *be the case* when there is motion in them, and there is nothing as close to the idea of motion as thought. Thought gives things motion, moves them in the mind, and it does so through language. We find agreement with Bachelard's idea (1966): thought is the transit between an object and an objective. The course between a *thing there* and an object of knowledge is plenitude of rational activity. Thus, the world is composed of events happening in the logic space of the world.

It clearly appears the rationalist idea and *logic* from Wittgenstein's concept on the world. The world is what happens in the thinker's thought horizon, it is not a given thing, passive, as Platon suggests when referring to sensible world. It is a dynamic space, but which dynamics is an action of movement in which (logic) activity of thinking *contaminates* things.

In essence, Wittgenstein represents the linguistic trend of idea of world. His ideas would be reflected in Gadamer's concepts. But logic-philosophy merger, definitively establishes a rationalist vision where the world surges holding hands with the linguistic: world is what is the case.

In our opinion, this linguistic trend, led by Wittgenstein's concepts, finds a *counterlook* in phenomenology, where the category *world of life* is developed as a response to a series of questions which, Husserl asks on tradition of thought, as we will explain below.

The world of life in Husserl as an alternative way of world scientifization

One of the main characteristics of the philosophic thought is that it is produced regarding ideas thinkers who relate the tradition. This idea finds sense in Husserl's reading of Kant. Modern thought finds a high point in Kant philosophy. And Husserl drinks from it, and –just against him - is how Husserl designs a path of making philosophy *mundane.* However, the system of Kant's ideas is so dense and interconnected that much effort is required to explain it in its essential points. For purpose of expressing the concept "world of life" the following exposition is centered in the general idea that, according to Husserl, Kant has about the relationship between the subject and the object.

The task assumed by Kant is a criticism to modern philosophy that he finds. In this thinker, *criticism* is task of *fundamentation,* but not the perception which contemporaneously we have about that word. *Criticism* approach to a reality implies reconstruction of its principles in order to seek new fundamentals (Hoyos, 2011:29). In this *criticism* Kant states for the subject it is impossible to access the whole object. This is because of an essential reason: the cognitive subject may just explain within his own strategies (which in Wittgenstein would be equal to say "within language") of which is exterior for him.

If seen well, Kant's research line is the same we had pointed in Platon, that is, the relationship between subject and reality. However, Kant intends an intermediate posture, where it is not assumed that the subject should get rid of its principles to see the reality, or one where it would be fully impossible to learn. Such intermediate posture requires to establish that this relationship between the subject and the object is found in terms of the *phenomenon and the neumenon.* The *phenomenon* would be manifestations of the object, while the neumenon would be the object itself, something that the subject is not able to understand (Blasco and other, 1999): Kant proposes that human knowledge is limited before the impossibility of directly access the neumenon, and that this is non-savable abyss; but, at the same time, that through the phenomenic the neumenon may be explained.

If we made an extrapolation of this categorization, we would find a great involvement for communication: since communication is a search for consensus of the real, it is necessary to understand that which may be exchanged among individuals is not the reality itself but manifestations of the reality, and even representations of this reality[6]

One of the main derivations of this Kantian criticism is the relationship of theory and practice. In *Fundamentation of physics of customs* (Kant, 1983; Deleuze, 1974), Kant outlines an example: if we examined the technical skills of any doctor to prepare any medication to cure a diseased individual, or to manufacture any poison, we would find two different levels of those situations: if we saw only the practical ability, that is technical reasonability, we would find a high performance, taking into account that both the medication cures while the poison kills. However, there is something different which is the intention of using such technical ability. This level would be ethics.

Thus, we find in Kant some dominions of reason, spaces where human rationality works. The pure reason, that would be knowledge, the technical reason referred to the ability of leading to the world of knowledge. A third dimension would be the ability to judge, that is, the dimension where man questions himself for the purposes it is worth to pursue and apply the practical reason, and the pure reason. In other words, Kant finds with theoretic and practical dominions as two different universes which find a space of synthesis in the ability to judge (Hoyos, 2011:20).

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6. Those implications that in Kant are little developd, will be the work line that Habermas will approach in ther explicit implications for communication, as stated below (Hoyos 2011:23).

However, a very important trait in Kant's work is that the ability of judging is both ethic and aesthetic, that is, a judgment is not only a theoretic reason, or just a practical reason, but space were sensibility plays its role. This shows us that in Kant the daily world has the sense of being the universe where technical reason and practical reason are validated, but, over all, the space where the power of judging is tested.

This schematic exposition serves us to introduce the place where Husserl appears. Because Husserl readings of Kant and Descartes lead him to think that there is too much interest in develeaing an abstract object. Notwithstanding, Husserl feels attracted by Kantian idea that judgment is a space of synthesis. That is, a place where theory negotiates with practice in order to make decisions. What he shares is that the greatest effort of *criticism* is placed in the *pure reason,* that is, a metatheory of theory, a metacognition of cognition. Otherwise, for Husserl "It is not a matter of ensuring objectivity, but understanding it". That trait introduces a transcendental search: Husserl's project moves then, on this way, toward a transcendental logic (Hoyos, 2011:17).

Husserl then suggests that it is in the scope of phenomena where it is advisable to found logic capability but not logic itself. In other words, that logic has fundamental in the practice (in practical reason, as stated by Kant), but not in theory (the pure reason in Kant's expression) (Hoyos, 2011:33). This supposes a great philosophic turn: it means lowering the look from the sky, from theoretic abstraction based on *logic* of logic, and placing it on the ground, just at men level. Claiming that logic is a practical issue would be equal, at this historical time, to a radical turn regarding speculating caliber that philosophical statements at the time were reaching.

It is at that turn where the *world of life* appears in Husserl's system of thinking:

> The central thesis of Husserl's studies regarding European sciences crisis, and transcendental phenomenology is the following: positivism […] has led to forget the authentic reflextion on the subject, the author of science and research, and at the same time, who uses its results, in cases where science considers the subject, as in Psychology, which is precisely done from objectiving attitude, through which it destructs it as a subject (Hoyos, 2011, p 31).

As a product of this abandonment, there is a non-savable difficulty: The impossibility of understanding the subject as a subject, on that way, an incomprehension of purpose of science and technique. As a resolution to that path with no apparent returning point, where science imbued in thousands of abstractions, on straight way from geometry to astrology, and where, even worse, the (surging) human sciences and social sciences continued to follow that endless abstraction path, Husserl proposes the world of life as a space where "…it is possible to explain subjectivity as the one giving sense and, therefore, as operating and practical subjectivity" (Hoyos, 2011:25). The greatest implication of this proposal is that science begins to bear sense as it provides light to understand the human world, that is, everything which is susceptible of getting available for human beings in their daily life.

It is necessary, then, to understand that the question of the world of life appears as a critical response (Hoyos, 2012) to the state of knowledge when Russerl is concluding his work. His purpose is to overcome the crisis of thought, in the sense of understanding that notwithstanding the status of knowledge was advanced in terms of the scientific, the status of thought was not, since this was focused on business quite beyond man scope. Therefore, it was necessary to found a new way of thinking and reach the reality, hand by hand with phenomenology, the most suitable method to approach the reality of men. This is the world of life.

At this state of things, the world of life appears, first, as a space that surges in opposition to the world of science (Acebes, 2001:94). We should remember that, this opposition world of science and world of man was in Platon in the myth of the cavern, and in Kant by separating the dominion of pure reason from practical reason. However, Husserl conceptualized that in the world of life, based on the sensible, and experience, that space where there are things that may bear sense for men, everything seems as endowed, per se, since the fundamental of this are questions intending to find sense to phenomena there, in front of the horizon of man's veiw (Palacio, 2005).

This means that the world of life does not opposes to science, but science is insufficient to explain the human reality, since it is one of the possible facets of reality, but not the only one. And moreover, if this is not connected to vital questions of man, and provides concepts which help to live a better life. In other words, science should be connected to human experience; it is not enough explaining human experience, or metaphysical experience, it would be necessary to provide concepts which allow to empower the experience of human living. As explained, it is clear that the world of life as one prescientific registry and other extrascientific one. Prescientific - because the world of life is the fundamental of science, the place where questions surge; extrascientific - because there are many dimensions in it, where science is not pertinent (Acebes, 2001).

This reflection surges from the evidence that science had exhausted the world, because its explanations often managed to exhaust the caudal of sense bore by many of the most concerning phenomena for man. There, where there were mysteries full of sources for investigation and human (imagination), science provides definitive, concluding closed answers, many of them very useful for the scientific world, but which at the end, what they achieved, was to shrink human horizon. Then in a certain way, the world of life is a stake for replevying that certain innocence, but not ingenuity, in the look toward the world, trying that science, in its infinite run toward abstraction, would give a turn of returning to man.

Then it appears a second notion of the world of life as "the world of sensible experience which comes in advance as a non-questioned evidence, and the whole mental life which nourishes from it, both the non-scientific and, finally, the scientific, too. (Acebes, 2001:96).

Thus the world of life sprouts as the cumulus of things which make sense for man. The fundamental of the world of life is a "natural attitude", an idea based on the

"epojé" concept, that advocates for a natural view, unprepared toward the reality. Note the word "natural" and "non naturalist". That is, imagining a human being standing in front of his surrounding and finds a number of things that he may relate to other ones, and these other ones to his life and individuals existing in his life. In this natural attitude we are "aware of a world, just with that reality in front of us, and which, without reflecting on it, we attribute an effective or real existence. In that attitude we are guided to things in a variety of manners, and we take them as they present to us, as they effectively exist in the space and in the time" (Acebes, 2001:98).

In that look objects are discovered; those objects have features. And, in addition, those objects are aimed at situations. And those situations are often related to us. In the phenomenologic view, those objects build a syntax. Objects and situations weave human being life, while he himself is the weaver and is weaved by that arrangement. This type of readings are the ones which allow to explain that, empirically, large abstractions of science are not necessary for man to be able to perform in a world that, as Biologists (Maturana and Varela, 1990) explain, is created by the human being, and in turn creator of that human being.

This is why after Husserl Sociology emphasizes on analysis of social structures and, in particular, institutions, since these are the entities that, in the world of life, regulate the mentioned existential grammar of the human being (Shutz and Luckmann, 2009). The sum of these objects/situations, mark the origin of horizons, a key concept.

> … a perceived object has as the horizon, current perceptive field of the subject. But this field, is likewise in a wider horizon, formed by the space out of perceptive momentary scope of the same subject, but the one which he counts on. he also counts on past time, as, without the need of explicitly remembering, he retains from it various senses of his previous experience; and likewise, he counts o the future, as the undefined group of possibilities of his experience and his activity, which possibilities are already suggested in a certain manner in current experience. Time so considered, lived time, is also a horizon. Yes, lastly, we expand on these considerations at the most possible extent, the major horizon and, in definitive, universal, the horizon of horizons, is the world. (Acebes, 2001:99).

Here comes a fundamental difference of the symbolic in man, which makes him being a human: he is able to see that there are possible worlds, configurations of existence in which he perhaps does not understand much, but which are over there being reality for many individuals. Different from the possibility of seeing many worlds, and building many visions *of the world,* animals only see things related to their organic dominion of existence. A fly sees just things of a fly, while human beings may configure looks in many directions, being aware that, there in those dominions of reality the world is different (Martin Serrano 2000; Maturana and Varela, 1990). By being aware of this matter, Maturana would say, we cease to be water in water. We may see us in an objective plane, and may get conscience that, as bodies, we are one more point within a much wider physical and symbolic universe. Thus, our life chains with a long tradition of lives and thoughts. *the world of life* is then the "soil" of those possibilities.

The body is the registry, the starting point which the world exists from, and may get sense: "Realities surged in the world of life as concrete things have a basic shape: corporality. Even, that thing which may not be taken just as a body (…), shows itself in the world of life as corporality" (Acebes, 2001:103; Villamil, 2003). Perception perceives shapes, either visual, acoustic, sound, or tactile; shapes are the representation that something exists. Of course, not only existing things may have a body, but imaginaries, too.

The body registered sensations produced by the world. And by so doing, it provides the world with sense, because ideas are abstractions from things having physically passed through it. Therefore, contrary to the tradition which he is a heir from, Husserl provides the body with a place by the way of replevying its role in building knowledge. Regarding tradition, this view would help in the non-passable over in actuality of "determining the authentic mode in which the human body deploys, thus ensuring access to its more proper access" (Johnson, 2011:115). Under the idea that *appearances deceive,* very firmly at classic schools and modern of thought, the body assigned the role of distorter, source of noise and temptation, and malign agent in the task of learning. And, Husserl talks of perception as an activity, non residual but diligent, in where we select which world inters into our existence, and which does not. Therefore, the concept of experience is important, since it talks of things (situations plus objects) which have passed through the body. That role causes perception to be transcendentally seen, not only as a physiological process, but as a point in the time where things are resolved, which will become decisive in terms of horizons of sense in the world of life.

Maturana talks about the paradox of conscience. The Platonic know yourself is an essential mandate in the governor's task, extendible according to hermeneutics of Foucault's subject (2004), to human beings: *you should know that you are to be located regarding others.* Knowing ourselves requires being aware of who we are. And, in a first instance, we are a body. The body is the registry of existence. Thus, the first thing that conscience gets aware of is just the body. And the great paradox which Maturana talks about is that conscience is made of the same flesh as the other is made of. It surges as something relevant the fact that the physical place where conscience surges does not have physical properties different from the other parts of the body. There, where the idea of the I is fixed, (which contemporaneously we locate in the body), there is the same matter as the one in the rest of the body (Maturana and Varela, 1990).

The above leads to be aware of circumstances. Wherever we are, we will always be in (a) situation. And that situation, we know it by own experience, may at a good extent determine the course of appearance things take:

> That explains why the body is a physical thing, something that posses existence with its properties of color, hardness, heat or cold, tenderness or roughness. And in turn that thing where each of us, feeling on it and in it, we find warm things, cold, even, soft, punching, delicious, insipid, etcetera.(Acebes, 2001:114).

Phenomenology as the entrance to daily life as the configuration space of sense of the world of life. Husserl is the thinker who creates the idea of the world of life, and Schutz and Luckmann, take him to the space of sociology to question how human beings build from interaction networks where shapes of the world of life are modulated. Both in Husserl and Shutz and Luckmann the phenomenologic is an approach where the body holds an important place. It may be noted that the notion of world is now far from the rationalist way and logic exposed on the occasion of Wittgenstein.

Shutz theory points out in the direction of contemporary studies where the question for reality and for various social topics is asked from the optics of social actors, their interaction methods, their ways of seeing the world, and their lifestyles (Mardones, 2011), there,

> The idea of the world of life allows to understand the social dimension in which sense frameworks are build that serve to interpret and act in the reality. It refers to processes and structures which facilitate comprehension of ways they are supported on, reproduce and transform lifestyles and thought in daily life (Rodriguez, 1996 p 200).

Schutz and Luckmann (2009) define that the world of daily life should be understood as the "reality scope that alert and normal adult simply presupposes in the attitude of common sense" (Schutz and Luckmann, 2009:26). In this dimension, everything is *non-problematic* in a first instance. There we see again the trait of the epojé, or natural attitude which Husserl speaks about.

Therefore, from the social phenomenology a view is established where social events also happen as a result of comprehension that subject has of the social and the reality. In this sense, we specially refer to two categories, that undoubtedly, find development in the Kantian apriori. Time and space are two conditions previous to the subject, from which this unavoidably builds, its idea of reality and knowledge. Time and space are two axis where sense of the world for subjects is configured.

In this sense, "daily experience not only concerns to the world as extension (space) but as duration" (Rodriguez, 1996:203). the world of life passes through a social space, a combination of subjective time and objective time. This intersection produces three modulations of temporality, in terms of a biological time, an objective referred to ages an interior time (and, over all, a conscience on interior elapsing of time), and a general time, measured and quantified by clocks, calendars and schedules.

Experience of the world is simultaneously social and inter-subjective. Individuals of the same generation appear in the world, fellows, of previous generations predecessors, of next generations or sucessors. And, simultaneously, there is an experience on the spatial, where things appear with an attainable scope, of manipulable things and a potential scope, where things appear which in the immediate present are not manipulable, but which may become so. A combination of these spatial, temporal, and related structures, is the one that marks structures of the world of life according to this theory on phenomenology of the social world. (Schutz and Luckmann, 2009).

It has been claimed that social phenomenology of Schutz and Luckmann aims at an attempt to articulate sociology with phenomenological perspective, but even in this proposal, there is a group of useful abstractions to categorize various phenomena of life, but not to prepare a proposal where communication really finds any conceptual support, to understand discursive dimension of man. This attempt corresponds to Habermas, an author where Kant's critical perspective finds a new meaning, since it is a project of thought leading to structure the basis of understanding among people. It deals with his theory of communicative action (Hoyos, 2012).

Habermas: world of life as a foundation of communicative action

The task undertaken by Habermas (1987) is to provide the communication action with a firm structure, by understanding that communication is a dimension of life, through which, agreements determining the course of the social are structured. Communicative action contains for this author, characteristics of a space which everybody believe understanding as something important, but where there are few clear ideas about how it functions. In the ideal itself of democracy there is the idea that decisions should be made by the majority, through argumentation, but it is not well clear how the process is shaped.

This task, it is worth to explain, is performed founded on a critic of Husserl and Schutz' theories, since none of them examine in depth texture of inter-subjectivity, but assume it as events happened themselves, a priory, which does not allow them a comprehension which takes the world of life from a simple theorization that not beyond a philosophic sociological speculation based on the cognitive, 2011). Following that line of concepts, perhaps the theory of communicative action is the conceptual scope where clearer track on the world of life regarding communication surges. It is what, just in Habermas, is named communicative action.

> The world of life is the horizon where communicative agents move (…). Language and culture are aspects composing the world of life itself. It is the space of problematized deep convictions, which convictions they suppose as guaranteed, and parting from them in each case is formed the context of understanding processes, where those involved use accredited definitions of the situation, and negotiate new definitions (Rodriguez, 1996:205).

Habermas (1987) assumes that it is necessary to rationalize the daily world, in terms of establishing limits, and scope of each component. For Habermas, these components are culture, society, and personality. Human life is defined in this triad, in terms of some "interpretative guides or basic assumptions on culture and its influence on the action (cultural world), "guides related to social relationships" (society), and, " the mode of people being" (personality) (Hoyos, 2011).

Coding guides of interaction, which Maturana and Varela (1990) call coordinations of actions, surge from various spheres of the world. In the cultural world, in terms of agreements surged on what things of the world mean; in the social world, coordination of action regarding inter-subjective encounter; and in the personal world or individual, coordination of actions related types of personality or lifestyles. Each sphere moves

for diverse interests, and makes each individual to be different, since experiences provided by the conjunction of his personal story with culture and society, where he should live, make his experiences to be similar; and shape a different way his way of being. In turn, societies are different because individuals grown in such society are different and have lived/built different destinations. In other words, they are three spheres of permanent and interdependent interaction.

The purpose of this first distinction is to establish how different purposes of communication are, and how they modify needs and product of communication in social groups, in social and interpersonal terms. Communication makes this world reproduce in terms of these spheres. We may find roots where Husserl (1991) states that the world is becoming intelligible for human beings. In Habermas it surges the need of founding this reproduction process, clearly explains how a human group manages to make its world intelligible for individuals arriving in it. Ways detected by the author are the functional aspect of understanding, that is, the ability developed by societies to perpetuate valid knowledge and cultural tradition; the aspect of coordinating the action related to stabilization of solidarity of groups, and the aspect of socialization and formation of actors capable of being accountable for their actions. Then we see there, the causes of each sphere in the world: the cultural (understanding), the social (collective action), and personality (accountable and active subjects).

Then three worlds surge: the objective world, "the total entities which true statements are possible on", the social world, as "legitimated and regulated interpersonal relationships", and the subjective world, "all of the own experiences that each has privileged access, that the speaker may truly express in public". Thus, criterions to decide that something is true change in each component of the world of life, while the objective world is the truth, in the social is uprightness, and in the inter-subjective it is the truthfulness. With these criterions of truth, it is understood that in the world of life, (that in Habermas would be the accumulate of the three spheres described above), each world keeps an implicit agenda of communication that subjects incorporate in procuring understanding.

According to what is stated so far, there is evidence of the category the world of life is relevant for communication. And in addition, that it holds a decisive fundamental in aesthetics, at seeing this concept in a wide dimension of sense, since it is founded on perceptual activity (Husserl) of the subject, as an activity where relevant decisions are made for subjective experience, which is, in turn, the fundamental of the social and cultural world (Habermas), and through this way, of communicative action. The world of life is a space full of aesthetic sense, and no longer that abstract space of geometry, but a vital space, inhabited, symbolized and full of meaning. Aesthetic and communication find, then, through the concept of world of life, an aesthetic fundamental related to sensibility in front of daily life, and a way of exchange and construction of sense from communication understood as exchange and discussion.

Gadamer: Language as meaning of the world

Gademar appearance in developing the idea *of the world of life*, is tied to his pretention of "… overcoming modernity in many senses. One of them lies on his constant and reiterated intention of ending with classic division (for modernity) between subject and object" (Rosales, 2009:31). This means that with Gadamer an approach is produced to a hermeneutic tool stated in terms other than positivism. Thus, we find in Gadamer a way of synthesis of the rationalist path illustrated in Wittgenstein (the world is what fits to mention within the world), and Husserl's vital way where the world of life surges as a recovery of the perceptive body in its reconstruction of the sense.

This opened perspective includes a decisive element: intentionality, already prefigured in Husserl: Man is in the world oriented toward comprehension of the world. This orientation implies that his readings, preferences and interpretations are anchored to his individual and social interests. Then, the idea of an intentionality moves the approach toward *the world of life*, or recognition of daily life as the scenary of realization of particular search. Given such search, installed in daily life related to the personal, postpones the possibility of an objectivist positivism.

> An important concept is that human intentionality makes that all projects by human being, bear in themselves, the mark of an intentionality, that is, nothing of which the subject may interpret is in the vacuum, since a reading, a search is already installed. This element is inherited from Husserl: "Intentionality says that every objective data share the conscience way of being. Intentionality, according to its origin, is a hermeneutic category […]. At understanding conscience as a way of being intentional, conscience is not the end of a confrontation but the primary composer of an intentional relationship" (Rosales, 2009:33).

This is how in the context of proposing hermeneutics as way of life, in chapter "Language as horizon of a hermeneutical ontology", Gadamer intends to rebuild a perspective where language is the fundamental of the human. In that purpose, and loyal to his style, he shows a panorama of the history of philosophic questions regarding language, as well as fundamental concepts developed through such language. There, Gadamer starts by declaring that there is a rupture in modern thought on language. A rupture which would be related to elimination of rationalist positivism in the view of relationship between man and his world.

> At particularly delving deeply into some phases of history of linguistic problem we have perceived certain points of view very from modern philosophy and science of language. From Herder and Humboldt, modern thought on language is dominated by a very different interest. Its objective would be studying how human language nature is deployed – a perspective laboriously won against rationalism and orthodoxy, in the amplitude of experiences of diversity of human language structure (Gadamer, 1991:526).

The context of differentiation that Gadamer stresses in Humboldt, in particular is that, in such thinker, language holds a transit place between individuality and human

nature. When Gadamer is asked about the possibility of an universal comprehension, the author answers that if all human beings may understand in anything, it is in the sensation that we not always have enough words to make us understood (Grondin, 2003). Such experience of non-plenitude surrounding words before and after said, is the space where all human beings could understand each other: in the sensation that we not always achieve comprehension of the other through what we say. In that space, Gadamer states, Humboldt procures a non-positivist conception of the language, since he is not always expected to be precise in mentioning things as if a linear and single cause existed between words and things (Blasco, 1999).

In Humboldt, the,

> … starting point is that words are the product of the 'force of human spirit'. There, where there is language linguistic force from the human spirit is in action, and each language is able to achieve the general objective which is intended through that natural force of man (Gadamer, 1991, p 527).

At this line of human spirit force where the action of sound occurs over the sense, Humboldt teaches to understand languages as a specific meaning of the world. Through each language we get a vision of the world (Gadamer, 1991:528). In this sense, word-thing relationships are happening in a field of a very considerable conflict, but not in that idea given by positivism that things operate as labels of always existing objects.

This is why linguistic method and content transmitted in any language are inseparable from hermeneutic experience, that is, from which those individuals have lived in their vital experience. Each language is a meaning as each language has transmitted, prefigured and allowed to think of different things. This issue implies that language is, already, a hermeneusis. Saying language is, immediately, refers to a hermeneutic process. In addition, for Gadamer, "not only the world is world as it access language: language only has its true existence in the fact that the world is represented in it" (Gadamer, 1991 p. 531). Having world is being able to behave regarding what happens in the world, which requires an individual conscience that goes out to encounter those nuances (horizons) that the world offers us, and even, being able to build our perspectives in the horizon of sense.

Those existing possibilities of going and returning between the subject and the world is what makes it necessary to talk of world in opposition to the surrounding. While the latter just provides us with a perspective, which not even is known that it is perspective, the world expands in multiple horizons. In opposition to the surrounding.

> …which characterizes man world relationship by opposition to the one of the other alive beings, is *their freedom in front of the surrounding*. This freedom includes linguistic arrangement of the world. One thing is a part of the other, and vice versa. Raising above coercions of what comes out to encounter us from the world means having language and having world […] this freedom in front of the surrounding is also freedom in front of men who give things, as expressed also by such deep narration of the Genesis according to which Adan received from God the power of placing men. (Gadamer, 1991:532).

This is how such human freedom implies a linguistic freedom, as each individual has a repertory of concepts and ideas on the world, which may be expanded as things of the world are lived. In turn, this amplitude of meaning that things of the world may take, is the greatest challenge to achieve human understanding, since subjects have different perceptions on the world, and it is not always possible to make the horizon line compatible, which we speak from, and which the others speak from.

There, it is worth to remember that language places us before a shared experience: we use signs not invented by us, which procure understanding with others (Monteagudo, 2012:9). That is, language, as stated above, combines individual nature and social of the subject. In summary, the world of life is, in Gadamer, the space where orientations derived from the intention of the subject of achieving things regarding the world, are realized. This intention, made possible by language, allows horizon notion to appear. Horizon is the world fraction which makes sense for the subject in any determined situation. The world of life is *"horizontic"*.

> …horizon which Gadamer talks about, is precisely this world-of-life in which the I performs on a preconscious and prethematic fashion. And according to Gadamer, this world-of-life is placed as opposed to a concept of world consisting of everything questionable by sciences, or, already from before, by the very conscience of the I. The world-of-life is presupposed in every experience, therefore, it is more originating than any other subsequent experience of conscience. The world of life, according to Gadamer, is a "horizontic" phenomenon, that is, it is a phenomenon that opens possibilities for comprehension of any other experience. That is why, it is a world which directly refers to subjectivity, and it is opposed to every objectivism, is historical and it does not refer to the world "which is", in speaking terms (Rosales, 2009:35).

According to the above, in man-world relationship, as measured, made possible and defined by language, there is a non-thematized experience of world (that one in which there is orientation to the world, but not explained in language), and experiences inherited from traditions settled in language. This second one refers to discourse circulating in the social world, and which the subject appeals in order to apprehend the world:

> … we opine that the 'world of life' both in its condition of scope of non-thematized originating evidence, and as the horizon of settled traditions, allows to deepen in that 'common world' that, on Gadamer's judgment, is precisely the condition of possibility of every hermeneutic experience, and every understanding among human beings (Monteagudo, 2012:7)

At this state of things, the journey that has taken us so far enables us to establish three points on which, in our opinion, it surges the possibility of recognizing *the world of life* as a preceding category of recent interest achieved from inquiring form daily life. A first idea is related to Platonic separation between the world of ideas and the sensible world. There, it is marked the contempt that, hereinafter, may thinkers are going to feel regarding senses, emotions, and everything which does not intend to question the reality. No question, when senses on daily life begin to appear, a first effort by authors is centered in validating daily issues as an object (deserving) study.

A second moment is marked by Wittgenstein's thesis according to which, the world is what exists within the scope of language, because in this manner the possibility of daily life was settled as a comprehensible scope (an idea also developed by Husserl), where the mission of arts (and science) would be to establish the struggle against silence, that is, approach to the unknown to build words (that is, concepts) from which to name and know it. Science and arts appear, as ways for expansion of linguistic dominion. The world (of life, of daily life) is everything that may be named; language hosts us, gives us a world in which we learn to perform. There is a grammar-world that surges hand-by-hand with Wittgenstein, where just the pertinent may be reliable, that is, that may be named.

Protagonism of the third moment corresponds to Husserl, the one where phenomenology is fixed as the access way to understand the world of life. This phenomenological method, as strong support of the perceptive, explains the importance of senses, (so ignored in classic philosophy), to explain the world. The idea of human intentionality stresses that man's being is, in itself, an act aimed at comprehension; intentionality implies that senses may not be expected to make neutral contributions to the reality as if they were machines taking pictures of the exterior. Otherwise, in the operating mode, human senses are available to serve a conscience, coded by interests, and encouraged by motivations. Recognizing the importance of the senses in human life, comes with the admission that daily world, previously demerited, deserves to be recognized as a space for important decisions.

In general, we see that daily life is rediscovered at the time of admitting new trends in thought, where hope for a new world, unique version of the reality, has been displaced by recognition of diversity of readings which the reality is susceptible of. Daily life appears plenty of objects, individuals and situations, before which subjects settle and make decisions. If together with Gadamer we may see there a hermeneutic aspect driven toward comprehension of the reality, we may find a scenary which is something but less anything passive.

No doubt, communication is the process through which pieces are assembled and consensus processes are shaped (Habermas), on which reality and strategies imply, from which it is decided to collective and individually assimilate it. We see then, that the daily is the scenary where human activities surge, including science, aesthetics, the way where sensible exchanges move, and communication, as the configuration process of inter-subjective agreements.

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