ΣΟΦΙΑ–SOPHIA

The beautiful and the good in oral and written speech: Plato's Phaedrus pedagogical implications

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Abstract

This article aims to understand Plato's arguments in Phaedrus' dialogue, which allow us to identify some of the implications of his proposal in both oral and written discourse and their impact on contemporary thinking. The above, through an exercise of bibliographical revision (appealing to primary and secondary sources), which enable the recognition that, finally, only who proceeds in the way indicated by this disciple of Socrates in his text Phaedrus, can be called "philosopher, lover of wisdom."

Key words: Philosophy, pluralism, oratory, discourse, pedagogy, Phaedrus.

Soc. Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define them as they are, and having defined them again to divide them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul, and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the more complex nature-until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nature allows them to be subjected to art, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading;-such is the view which is implied in the whole preceding argument.

Introduction

Pretending to conjecture about one of the dialogues of this classical philosopher of ancient Greece invites the reader to approach the richness of his thought by recognizing, in Platonic philosophy, significant contributions to epistemological, anthropological, ontological, theological, political, and pedagogical problems among others, that even with the passage of the centuries, continue present in the contemporary thought.

In order to situate the dialogue of Phaedrus[1] in its chronological context in relation to the Platonic work, Emilio Lledó Iñigo affirms, in his introduction to the Gredos (1988) edition, that this writing has been the object of many and varied contradictions regarding the manufacture date:

> "They say that the first work he wrote was Phaedrus," says Diogenes Laertius (llI 38). Perhaps the adjective "youthful" (*meirakiodes*) which Diogenes conveys in the same passage about the "problem" addressed by Phaedrus could have led Schleiermacher to defend, in the nineteenth century, the thesis that it was indeed, *Phaedrus*, if not the first, one of the earliest writings of Plato in which it was made a kind of program of what was to be developed later. (Lledó, 1988: 292).

In the book Paideia, by Werner Jaeger, he also states that this dialogue seems to be appreciated as a primitive work of Plato and, in turn, it reflects the program itself of the Platonic Academy; in addition, it was also considered for a long time:

> (...) as the natural starting point for understanding the last ends to which Plato's work as a writer and his educational methods were directed. It provided the briefest compendium of Platonic ideas about the relationship between writing, spoken word and thought, and it was therefore the portico by which everyone entered to Plato's philosophy temple. (Jaeger, 2001: 982).

However, in the same edition of Gredos already mentioned, it is suggested that Phaedrus, along with Phaedo, the Banquet and the Republic form part of the group of dialogues considered of maturity of their author, placing it among the last writings and preceded by the Republic. However, despite the controversy arising from the chronological location of the dialogue, in which several authors agree -- and it appears clear in this article--, is in the importance of this: "Divided into a prologue, three speeches on erôs, love (q.v.) and a discussion of good and bad speaking and writing (Gonzalez, Nails, & Tarrant, 2012: 78), this dialogue in which, unlike the Banquet: "Not the positive, but the negative sides of erôs are highlighted in the first two speeches "(Gonzalez, Nails, & Tarrant, 2012: 79), making it possible, to a large extent, a reader's approach to the understanding of Platonic thinking.

However, before developing the central theme of this article, and bearing in mind that within the dialogue, object of the same, it is contained --among others-- the myth of the winged chariot, one of the most outstanding allegories of Platonic thought, it is necessary to try to understand in a somewhat succinct but clear way, the role played by myth in Plato's thought. First, it must be recognized a Platonic myth:

"A delicate fabric that can be destroyed by any attempt to separate its interwoven threads" (Guthrie, 1990: 350), since they form an indissoluble relationship or mixture of concepts and categories of epistemological, ontological, anthropological, pedagogical, ethical and political order, among others, which account for the philosophical doctrine of Plato.

Secondly, one must understand what the myth's purpose was in those days: "In Plato's days, a clear-cut line between a myth (or religious belief) and what was considered as a scientific fact could not be drawn "(Guthrie, 1990: 349), which is why this duality between truth and lies must be avoided in understanding the myth with which Plato ultimately tries to deal with the understanding of issues that probably cannot be understood merely through dialectical discussion, as explained by the quoted author when referring to the character of the Platonic myth:

> The truth is not in a literal interpretation of the details of the story, but in the lesson it conveys by showing that Socratic ethics is not only morally superior ... but that ultimately it leads to greater happiness for the individual. It is an extension of the argument with which it enters regions that are beyond the scope of the dialectic discussion (Guthrie, 1990: 298).

In addition to this, each myth must be read, understood and interpreted in the context of the dialogue, since each colloquium provides the pedagogical tools necessary to understand it, its rational contents and what it means, which makes these myths an instrument of knowledge of great scope and relevance to the interior of Plato's philosophy, as they are presented not only as simple: "Stories that tell children, fictitious in content" (Guthrie, 1990: 467), but also: "In the case of being good myths, they illustrate moral truths, or transparent allegories "(Guthrie, 1990: 467). Thus, the myth constitutes an important pedagogical, didactic and conceptual resource for understanding different issues, such as moral ones, whose approach exceeds the exposure of simple theoretical contents. In addition, it must be said: "In the Republic and in Phaedrus, the myth gains independence in its content; it must not explain but reveal "(Görgemanns, 2010: 63), being with this a discourse of revelation.

Development

Regarding the particular object of this writing, concerning the beautiful and the good in oral and written discourses (whether academic, political or legal), seen in the light of the dialogue of Phaedrus of Plato and its possible implications in the contemporary world, it can be said that this is, in the first instance, an invitation to "leave Athens", "to leave the walls" in which men are locked up, and in which are included some of the currents of the contemporary thinking:

> Socrates. Phaedrus, my friend! Where have you been? And where are you going?
>
> Phaedrus. I was with Lysias, the son of Cephalus, Socrates, and I am going for a walk outside the city walls because I was with him for a long time, sitting there the whole morning. You see, I'm keeping in mind the advice of our mutual friend Acumenus, who says it's more refreshing to walk along country roads than city streets.
>
> Socrates. He is quite right, too, my friend. So Lysias, I take it, is in the city?
>
> Phaedrus. Yes, at the house of Epicrates, which used to belong to Morychus, near the temple of the Olympian Zeus.
>
> Socrates. What were you doing there? Oh, I know: Lysias must have been entertaining you with a feast of eloquence.
>
> Phaedrus. You'll hear about it, if you are free to come along and listen. (Plato, 1988: 309-310) (227a-b).

Thus, there is a longing to find an appropriate place that promotes new experiences in the face of knowledge. In this sense, Socrates suggests: "Let us turn aside and go by the Ilissus; we will sit down at some quiet spot." (229a), for it is in the tranquility of the soul, in its encounter with the sensible world, where the recognition of the reality that inhabits the world of ideas and, the truth with it, is possible, leaving behind *the city and the institutionalization of knowledge*, thus facilitating the learning of philosophy as a matter of personal character, mediated by the dialogue through which reality happens to men.

In these first words with which Phaedrus begins, the importance of the dialogue in Platonic thought is evident, whose literary form receives a didactic interpretation by Görgemanns, according to which:

> Philosophical thoughts could not be transmitted through a book (as Plato makes clear in Phaedrus), but only through didactic conversations. However, the disadvantages of writing could be overcome if the book imitated a didactic conversation. It would have as its purpose 'that the reader be brought either to the proper inner creation of the idea that Plato has in mind or to a certain thought after not having found nor having understood anything. (Görgemanns, 2010: 51).

The dialogue, therefore, facilitates the philosophical exercise by not transmitting a certain doctrine, and allowing interlocutors/readers to reach a conclusion

but from their own reflections, which were made possible by the very message that contains the dialogue. Regarding this message, Alexandre Koyre states:

> This message, as we are told, is, of course, philosophical, and the dialogues involve a teaching; but this assurance is again not a doctrinal one but a method lesson. Socrates teaches us the use and value of precise definitions of the concepts used in debates, and the impossibility of achieving them if we do not proceed before to a critical revision of the traditional notions, the "vulgar" conceptions accepted and incorporated in language (Koyre, 1966: 25).

In this way, the dialogue as a method approves the shift from the sensible world to the world of ideas, philosophizing and generating strategies for both the thought and the dialogue itself; to say, what is made possible through other sayings and which, in this way, feeds the λογοçlogos.

Following Martha Nussbaum, there is one final contextual aspect of great importance that must be added in relation to Socrates:

> Historical Socrates never wrote. He did not (if we believe the Platonic version) because he thought that the true value of philosophy lies in the interaction of teacher and disciple, when the former guides the latter questioning him (sometimes gently, others roughly; according to the character and resistance of the interlocutor) to make him more aware of his own opinions and the relationships among them. (Nussbaum, 2004: 181).

This explanation, to exemplify what was said about the pretension of the myth, becomes clearer after reading the myth of *Theuth and Thamus*, in which the Egyptian king rejects the art of writing offered by the god *Thamus*:

> Oh most ingenious *Theuth!* The parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. (Plato, 1988: 403).

Thus conceived then, a philosophical dialectic is understood that teaches with art, that accurately shows the truth that rests in the reality on which the discourse deals with, that in the words of Socrates: "It is written with science in the soul of the learner; capable of defending himself, and knowing who to talk to and before to whom remain silent (Plato, 1988: 405).

Nussbaum says about it:

> True philosophy, as understood by Socrates, is the compromised search for truth, in which not only the acceptance of certain conclusions is important, but the follow-up of a certain path leading to them, not only to reach the correct content, but doing it through the knowledge, and the knowledge of true themselves. (Nussbaum, 2004: 182).

But this discourse, which becomes possible in the dialectical exercise, does not forget to be astonished and at things, for everyday as they seem, as well as the manifestations of Socrates:

> By Hera, it really is a beautiful resting place. The plane tree is tall and very broad; the chaste-tree, high as it is, is wonderfully shady, and since it is in full bloom, the whole place is filled with its fragrance. From under the plane tree the loveliest spring runs with very cool water our feet can testify to that. The place appears to be dedicated to Achelous and some of the Nymphs, if we can judge from the statues and votive offerings feel the freshness of the air; how pretty and pleasant it is; how it echoes with the summery, sweet song of the cicadas' chorus! The most exquisite thing of all, of course, is the grassy slope: it rises so gently that you can rest your head perfectly when you lie down on it. You've really been the most marvelous guide, my dear Phaedrus. (Plato, 1988: 316) (230b, e).

It was said, some paragraphs ago, that the dialogue began with an invitation made by Phaedrus to Socrates to leave Athens, in order to enable a philosophical exercise that was not distracted or conditioned by the walls that predetermined the thought. This exercise, thus proposed in this dialogue, will therefore be as much of the man as to the cultivation of his soul, as epistemological, as it tends to the rational justification of beliefs about nature, of man and of the other, and is in this, precisely, where lies the current importance of accepting this invitation, to effectively exit the levees that moderate and measure reflection and thought.

It is intended, with this, the abandonment of those discourses which, on the one hand, lack necessary and above all sufficient reasons to justify what in them is affirmed as true, becoming, for that reason, in chatting; and on the other hand, discourses that only manage to affect emotions in their interlocutors through appearance and persuasion, characteristic of a type of rhetoric that does not know interests of epistemological order necessarily present in those individuals who are restless by some type of duly justified knowledge, speeches such as that of Lysias, for example, which end up denying a properly philosophical education, insofar as they deny the necessity of the dialectical method as a tool to arrive at the truth of what is being said, and which enables a rhetoric based on simple verisimilitudes (*eikós*).

This does not imply that rhetoric, as a form of discourse, is censored in its entirety by Plato. On the contrary, it makes a difference between two possible rhetorical forms: the sophist as the one that objects in the discourse of Lysias; and the philosophical one, which is reached through the dialectic, and to which Phaedrus, in some way, invites through the philosophical exercise of reflection and search for the Good, as Mary McCoy states:

> While sophistic rhetoric seeks only to gratify its audience, philosophical rhetoric seeks to lead the soul to further inquiry and reflection, and to the good itself. By including both advocates and critics of rhetoric in the dialogues, Plato encourages his readers to seek to understand more deeply the question of how one ought to live one's life (McCoy, 2012, p 243).

Now, considering this issue from contemporariness, one could ask a question regarding the educational and political processes that currently govern the academic and political-social spheres: Are we moving in the path of Lysias' speech and his bad rhetoric, in which it is argued from false premises intentionally and ignoring the truth? If so, these processes would be vitiated by that technique that repudiates Socrates in Lysias and by virtue of which, this sophist receives the epithet "logograph" (λογογραΦς[2] speech composer), being installed, also, as an object of problematization in Phaedrus dialogue.

This scriptural tendency of Lysias, an important representative of the rhetoric of the time, led Socrates to make a first discourse that was clearly affected by this condition of a fallacious and persuasive character. Such an event compelled Master Socrates, as only the truth can do, to a second discourse, constructed this as a public retraction or "palinodia- παλινωδια», for having agreed to continue with the game of Lysias.

This "palinodia" provoked by a mysterious call of his demons, according to Luis Gil (1983) in his translation of Phaedrus, is in essence the invitation that Socrates makes to tell the truth where falsehood was intentionally said before. Palinodia is the one to which Socrates arrives after discovering his face, because he had covered it to cross the path of Lysias, characterized by a clear indifference for the truth with respect to the Love:

> (...) suddenly, (Socrates) realizes that his soul has been stained by the impure words of his mouth. He has reviled a god, the god *Eros*, who, as mythological legends relate, is the son of Aphrodite, and therefore deserves praise and not the criticisms that have been thrown on him by the two uttered speeches. (García, 2007: 112).

Then, after purification carried out with "reverential fear," Socrates retracts, on the one hand, for having erred in his reasoning; and on the other, for having sinned against the god Eros-EPOC as a product of the spell of which he was a victim. This is the reason of his words, when affirming:

> I'm going to try to be wiser than them, at least in this. Therefore, before any misfortune comes to me because I have cursed Love, I will offer him a palinode, with an open face, and not covered as before by shame (Plato, 1988: 339) (243b).

Hence the importance of updating in this writing the question in the following terms: How many propositions and/or arguments, built within the walls of the educational, political and academic scenario, claim for a palinode in their speakers, that is to say, they require evident public retractions for being placed in the intentional way of the mere persuasion, appearance and approval of the majorities, independently of the truth that lies in them?

Structure of the dialogue

Regarding the structure of Phaedrus dialogue, it is possible to affirm that this can be understood from two great moments: in the first one, it is recognized as the central theme of EPOC- *eros* and it is developed through three discourses. A first discourse, constructed by Lysias and read by Phaedrus, and the next two ones by Socrates. In the first Socratic discourse, as indicated, it was followed the structure indicated by the rhetorician Lysias, with Socrates supporting the idea of the indifferent lover; the second discourse, on the other hand, is projected by Socrates in the form of a retraction (palinodia) in honor of the constitutive truth of good and beautiful rhetoric. Described in Jaeger's Paideia, the structure of the dialogue is mentioned as follows:

> The so-called erotic part, the first one, begins with the reading and critique of a discourse by Lysias, who is presented as the leader of the most influential rhetorical school in Athens, which in Socrates' time was at the height of his prestige. Plato successively confronts two discourses of Socrates on the same subject, the value of *eros*, to prove one of two things; how, on the basis of Lysias' false premises on *eros*, one can treat the same subject better than he does; or how this problem should be exposed when one knows what it truly is. In the second part, in accordance with the above, he begins by exposing in a rather general way the defects of the rhetoric and rhetorical systems prevailing in Socrates' time, to then clarify the merits of the Socratic dialectic as a means of a true rhetoric (Jaeger, 2001: 984-985).

For the second moment of the dialogue, it is presented the theme of rhetoric and the true discourse about

love and soul, accompanied by the plot about the convenience or not of writing, is presented. In this way, the text reaches its unity and harmony, becoming consistent by virtue of true rhetoric as an object of concern.

The beautiful and good speech

In light of the above, it is pertinent, in the light of the dialogue discussed here, to ask "How is then possible the beautiful and good construction of the discourse? What is the way to write well? (258d) What is the cause why a speech, spoken or written, is or is not good?

All these questions are somewhat solved, according to Julian Marias in his introduction to Phaedrus text (1948), by the *modus operandi* outlined by Plato in his attempt to reach the *episteme*. With such pretension, Plato, in *Phaedrus* and through Socrates, makes a forceful objection to Lysias' speech and his own about love, pointing out that in these discourses there has been no discussion of what the subject is, and inviting this way to:

> (...) To have clarity on the matter of which it is deliberated (example, define: What is love? What does it consist in? What is its strength?) Avoiding this, it is easy to incur in errors. In addition to this, Plato claims the importance of definition as it allows "1) to have the object in sight; 2) to agree (on something). There is no such agreement in the sophistical or rhetorical dialogue, and it may occur that is not about the same thing. But if one starts from a definition and this was the end of the discourse, the entire dissertation would be left over (Marias, 1948: 91-92).

Following this order of ideas, and as a first approximation as a response to the above questions, *clarity* is recognized as a condition of possibility for beautiful and good speeches, clarity that is only achieved in the presence of truth. This is contrary to what was previously said by Phaedrus to Socrates, when he says:

> Phaedrus. "Look, then, at what I heard on this subject, my dear Socrates, that whoever pretends to be an orator does not need to learn what it really is, just, but what people think, who are the ones in charge of judging; nor what is truly good or beautiful, but only what it seems. For it is from appearances where persuasion comes, and not from the truth. (Plato, Dialogue III (Phaedo, Banquet and Phaedrus), 1988: 373) (260°).

It is against this kind of teaching that Plato's philosophical and pedagogical proposal is installed. As the first recommendation given by Socrates is that the discourse has as its beginning and starting point the truth about what is spoken, because the thinking of the speaker should be aware of this truth in order to not approach the subject from fallacious and only apparent presuppositions. This argument in Socrates will be accompanied by a series of myths and/or stories that enable, through images, the argumentative forcefulness of the philosopher. Thus, in order to respond to the mentioned questions, Plato refers, for example, to the myth of cicadas and the gift they can give to human beings (259c), pretending that these spend their lives in philosophy and honor their music.

After what has been pointed out, Plato, through Socrates, continues to examine the causes for which a spoken or written discourse is or it is not good:

> Socrates. Well, then, we ought to examine the topic we proposed just now: When is a speech well written and delivered, and when is it not?
>
> Phaedrus. Plainly.
>
> Socrates. Won't someone who is to speak well and nobly have to have in mind the truth about the subject he is going to discuss? (Plato, 1988: 373) (259e).

To give clarity to this, Plato --in the voice of Socrates-- exposes the analogy of recommending a donkey as if it were a horse (260b), then adding a criticism to the master of rhetoric who studies people's opinions and appearances for the purpose of persuading, ignoring the truth that is built in relation to the object:

> Socrates. And so, when a rhetorician who does not know good from bad addresses a city which knows no better and attempts to sway it, not praising a miserable donkey as if it were a horse, but bad as if it were good, and, having studied what the people believe, persuades them to do something bad instead of good-with that as its seed, what sort of crop do you think rhetoric can harvest?
>
> Phaedrus. A crop of really poor quality.
>
> Socrates. But could it be, my friend, that we have mocked the art of speaking more rudely than it deserves? For it might perhaps reply, "What bizarre nonsense! Look, I am not forcing anyone to learn how to make speeches without knowing the truth; on the contrary, my advice, for what it is worth, is to take me up only after mastering the truth. But I do make this boast: even someone who knows the truth couldn't produce conviction on the basis of a systematic art without me." (Plato 1988: 374-375).

Plato was thus undoubtedly trying to set the example of a new rhetoric with scientific grounds, to overcome the yoke of rhetoric based on persuasion, appearances and mere *opinion*; understood (this) --in its epistemological sense-- as the opposite of *episteme*, a proposal that within Phaedrus reveals an urgency to purify the

speaker's propositions and arguments, in this case, with regard to the theme of love and soul, as Luis Gil (1983) points out in his comments on the text of Phaedrus:

> What else is scientific rhetoric but philosophy in its purest sense, an attempt to come to the knowledge of the true realities of things to infuse into the souls of the components of the audience persuasion and virtue? The subject of love is thus fully justified within the general economy of dialogue. And the same must be said of the subject of the soul. (Gil, 1983: 248).

Plato thus shows in his dialogue through the theme of love and soul that a discourse, whether oral or written, to be beautiful and good cannot ignore the truth of the object of discourse because, if so, it would be despicable in itself, typical of the rhetoric of his time, as confirmed in the voice of Socrates: "Therefore, my friend, the art of a speaker who doesn't know the truth and chases opinions instead is likely to be a ridiculous thing--not an art at all!"(262 c). The discourse, thus constituted, would then be doomed to failure for its ignorance of truth, at preferring --rather than *alétheia-*αληθξια-- the *doxa-δσξα* (state of opinion lacking in sufficiency), and walking for that reason, along the path of philosophical ignorance, which consists in not knowing what one should know when one speaks or writes. But in addition, Plato links to this concept the one of the *techné*:

> (...) He denies that rhetoric is an art in the strict sense of the word and considers it as a simple routine, devoid of any material basis. It can only become a true art on the condition that it be based on the knowledge of the truth. (Jaeger, 2001: 989).

Having clarified the subject of truth that must be underlined in the discourse to be considered beautiful and good, it follows the second recommendation of Plato for these purposes, which consists in the recognition and understanding of the differences and similarities between things as a method to classify them. Plato emphasizes the importance of analyzing little by little, step by step, each of the components relative to the argument, avoiding to incur the comparison of everything with everything, and to operate in a unique and exclusive way with the resources of the similarity, as it is common in rhetoric.

> Socrates. I think it will become clear if we look at it this way. Where is deception most likely to occur-regarding things that differ much or things that differ little from one another?
>
> Phaedrus. Regarding those that differ little.
>
> Socrates. At any rate, you are more likely to escape detection, as you shift from one thing to its opposite, if you proceed in small steps rather than in large ones.
>
> Phaedrus. Without a doubt.
>
> Socrates. Therefore, if you are to deceive someone else and to avoid deception yourself, you must know precisely the respects in which things are similar and dissimilar to one another.
>
> Phaedrus. Yes, you must.
>
> Socrates. And is it really possible for someone who doesn't know what each thing truly is to detect a similarity-whether large or small-between something he doesn't know and anything else?
>
> Phaedrus. That is impossible.
>
> Socrates. Clearly, therefore, the state of being deceived and holding beliefs contrary to what is the case comes upon people by reason of certain similarities.
>
> Phaedrus. That is how it happens.
>
> Socrates. Could someone, then, who doesn't know what each thing is ever have the art to lead others little by little through similarities away from what is the case on each occasion to its opposite? Or could he escape this being done to himself?
>
> Phaedrus. Never. (Plato, 1988: 378).

Thus, in the cited argumentation, what is involved in recognizing the word as an authentic art, always nourished by the truth of what is said as a condition for the beautiful and the good, far away from mere opinions (δσξα *doxa*) that would make it look like ridiculous and gross.

Finally, it is inferred from the dialogue of *Phaedrus*, as a third consideration, that the oral discourse and the writing must be constituted as a living organism, consisting of head and limbs that are reciprocally linked in a way that is not therefore headless: "every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work. " (264c) (Plato, 1988: 291); and it is therefore in order. (264c) (Plato, 1988, p. 291). This situation is confirmed by Werner Jaeger in the *Paideia* when he points out that every speech:

> It must have, like a living being, an organic body. It must not lack head nor feet, but (it must) have a true trunk and true limbs, and all these members must keep a proper relationship with each other and with the whole. From this point of view, Lysias' discourse constitutes a totally flawed product. Plato discovers here a deep vision of what must be the literary composition. (Jaeger, 2001: 990).

This third recommendation of Plato is conjugated with the previous one, in which it was suggested that the speaker was in the capacity to distinguish the differences and similarities of the things about which he speaks, being able to classify them and having –for that-- to know them in their truth, as Mary McCoy says:

> Socrates then describes a positive form of rhetoric that uses a method of collection and division (q.v. Method) that draws together what one wishes to explain into a common category, and then divides it again according to its 'natural joints' (Phdr . 265d–e). Ideally, a speaker's discourse should be well ordered, like a 'living being' (264c) (McCoy,2012: 242).

Now, in order to truly achieve Good and Beauty through discourse, as it has been exposed throughout this article, it is necessary that the speakers/writers, in addition to following all these recommendations, study, know and understand the nature of the soul of those who listen to them, of who read them, for only by doing this recognition will these orators or writers know what kind of speech they must address in order to reach the soul of their interlocutors (or readers), as it is stated by Roman Cámara:

> To realize the idea of an art of discourse, speakers must study the nature of the soul, see if it is simple or composed, the parts that constitute it, and what it can do or affect it. They will have to classify the genres of discourses and souls to know what kind of souls are allowed to be persuaded by what kind of discourse. Speakers will also need to observe others in action, relate their success to theory, and learn by themselves to apply this theory (Román Cámara, 2008: 196).

This recognition of the Other (person) and the Other (content), which determines the structure and content of the speech itself, which selects the appropriate words to achieve the effect with which it is intended, which opens the possibility of understanding the other to direct it --from its particularity-- to the message of discourse, is nothing more than the pluralism that today demands academic, political --and even legal-- contemporary scenarios. As it has been emphasized before, in other different spaces where the same principle of recognition of difference and diversity was used, pluralism becomes a challenge and a necessary compromise within all those contexts that suppose an educative pretension, whether at the academic, political or citizen level, as various authors have put it into effect. Thus, from the legal and citizen point of view, Rengifo-Castañeda, Wong Jaramillo & Posada stated the following:

> Legal Pluralism, insofar as it assumes that there are different contexts, groups of beliefs and values, does not necessarily deny objectivity. The legal rules, when dealing with unequal contexts, suggest different interpretations. The irrational would be that in the same context, the same belief system would generate contradictory interpretations (...). Thus, Legal Pluralism, by assuming the variable condition of human culture picks up an objective trait of humanity: its diversity. (Rengifo-Castañeda, Wong Jaramillo & Posada, 2013: 37).

At Academy level, similarly linked to citizenship, Vélez Medina stated:

> (...) today, university has begun to coexist with the plurality of contents, ideas, methods and truths. Not all of the current academic community is convinced of dogmatism, there's even a perception now that left-wing radicalism is not the solution: "If we were to recognize the depth of our differences, perhaps we could opt for the plural idea of the university that we want to reform" (Hoyos, 1998). The post-metaphysical university is one that does not refuse to radically confront its precepts, thoughts or forms of life, because it understands that almost all of them are incompatible and complementary in the end. This academy, which is beginning to emerge (still unrecognized), has the mission of no longer seeking truth, but of accepting different conceptions of good, propitiating scenarios of world interpretation and awakening the capacity to weave social, geo-political, economic and scientific relations in the face of world events (Vélez Medina, 2014: 252).

Thus, following the Socratic discourse, it is the recognition of that pluralism which determines, finally, whether or not speech has achieved beauty and perfection in saying, teaching, or writing:

> Since the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul, whoever intends to be a rhetorician must know how many kinds of soul there exist. Their number is so-and-so many; each is of such-and-such a sort […] The orator must learn all this well, then put his theory into practice and develop the ability to discern each kind clearly as it occurs in the actions of real life. […] He will now not only be able to say what kind of person is convinced by what kind of speech; on meeting someone he will be able to discern what he is like and make clear to himself that the person actually standing in front of him is of just this particular sort of character he had learned about in school-to that he must now apply speeches of such-and-such a kind in this particular way in order to secure conviction about such-and-such an issue. When he has learned all this-when, in addition, he has grasped the right occasions for speaking and for holding back; and when he has also understood when the time is right for speaking concisely or appealing to pity or exaggeration or for any other of the kinds of speech he has learned and when it is not-then, and only then, will he have finally mastered the art well and completely. (Plato, 1988: 396-397).

Conclusions

The dialogue of Phaedrus gives an account of Plato's attitude towards the rhetoric inferred from Lysias, and what must be constituted as the presuppositions for a new rhetoric with the necessary scientific bases in his Paideia, since the objective pursued in Phaedrus is the formation of the spirit of both the speaker and the writer, effectively contrasting rhetorical education with philosophical education, as Jaeger clarifies in his comments to Phaedrus:

True writing is that what is recorded in the soul of the learner, because the learner has the strength to go to his own aid. The only benefit of what is written, printed with ink, is that it remembers what is already known. While the rhetoric of the time is increasingly oriented towards the art of writing and "graphic discourse," Plato founds the educational superiority of philosophical dialectic upon it, in the fact that it directly addresses the spirit and forms it (Jaeger, 2001: 997).

For this reason, according to Julian Marias, Plato' philosophy distinguishes between

An acquisition (κτισις) of knowledge, a use (χρησεις) of it and a habit (εζις) that it creates in the soul, and which is what makes in a correct way that be properly used. Hence, his greater confidence in the dialogue than in the writing (Marias, 1948: 94).

All the above said is a clear proposal of a pedagogical order that configures the soul of both the writer and the speaker, in correspondence with the beautiful and good speech, and based on both the truth and its structure. It is, in short, the writing that is engraved in the soul of the learner, and that forms it, being this the essence of true education that transits between true rhetoric and a constant dialectic, the latter allows to achieve clarity and coherence between the one and the multiple, as a basis for structuring thinking around a beautiful and good construction of discourse. Perhaps it is this fabrication, as suggested by Plato, which starts from the truth that provides clarity and extends to the parts that make up the argument or the discourse, which could also allow to reclaim credibility in the speaker who performs in the current educational, political and legal scenarios; and with it, to recover at the same time the beauty and the goodness in political and academic exercise.

Footer

1. According to Emilio Lledó: "The character that gives name to the dialogue is a historical character. He was son of the Athenian Ptotocles, friend of Demosthenes and, later, of Esquines. Phaedrus also appears in the Protagoras (3l5c) surrounding the sophist Hippias who lectured on the meteors. At the *Banquet*, it is Phaedrus the first to begin his discourse on Eros (178a-180b)." (Plato, Dialogue III (Phaedo, Banquet and Phaedrus), 1988, p.293).

2 Lysias had been "censured by a politician for his profession of composer of speeches. Socrates responds to this that the mere fact of writing itself is not reprehensible, but doing it wrong, taking the word *logographia* not in its usual sense, but the etymological one of writing speeches on any matter "(Plato, The Banquet, Phaedo, Phaedrus, 1983, p.268). Translation by Luis Gil.

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