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Emotions in Aristoteles: psychic faculties in the formation of opinions and judgments

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Abstract

Emotions for Aristotle are emotional faculties in human beings, which can generate susceptibility and cause that at some point, judgments be changed, and that other types of impressions be generated; they are accompanied by pleasure and pain, depending on the states of mind with which they may occur at the moment of feeling some emotion. In this article, in addition to developing a reflection on emotions from the Stagirite, some of them and their opposites are described, which are the most common in all their writings, such as: anger and calm; love and hate; fear and trust; shame and shamelessness; compassion and indignation; and finally, envy and emulation.

Keywords: Pain, emotions, passions, pleasure.

Introduction

Emotions are mechanisms of rapid reaction in unexpected situations and are manifested automatically; they are also unexpected phenomena that can result in simpler situations. But if we talk about unexpected reactions, we must say that besides that, they are also instinctive and highly cognitive reactions, as Aristotle said, and they depend on how we interpret emotions, as if they were the behavior and motives of others (Konstan, 2004). For Lacunza (2004): “Emotions can be considered momentary, abrupt, uncontrollable, irrational and incomprehensible events [...]; they are manifested through bodily syndromes, which has led different scientists to study their role in the evolution of man” (p.1).

In the same way, Belli, Harré and Iñiguez (2010) consider that emotions:

Correspond to natural bodily experiences that people cover with language in order to express them, this expression being considered irrational and subjective. That is to say, first we feel in the body what later comes out through our mouths in the form of a discourse that, in a certain way, is opposed to reason. Emotions are also said to be generated in the unconscious and not in the will; they are more spontaneous than artificial, (and they) are more felt than heavy (p.3).

Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, tells us that emotions are the cause of men changing their judgments, and that they become fickle; in addition that emotions are followed by the sorrow and the pleasure [1]; as it happens in some of them, as they are for Aristotle, 2010b,

“[...] the anger, the compassion, the fear and other more of a similar nature; and their opposite. Now, in each one, three aspects

must be distinguished: in relation to anger -for example-, in what state the angry can be found, against those who are often irritated and for what reasons; because if we only have one or two of these aspects, but not all of them, it is not possible to inspire anger (p.696).

Emotions in Aristotle

Emotions influence the formation of opinions and the formulation of judgments, as stated by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (Campeggiani, 2014). For Aristotle, it is in accordance with the emotional faculties where human beings are susceptible to be impressed; in addition, depending on the habitual states, it is where one has the inclination to the passions experienced in a certain way, or being free of them (Aristotle, 2011a.). To clarify this reflection, Aristotle in the *Eudemian Ethics*, establishes the difference that exists between the passions, faculties and ways of being; thus Aristotle:

[...] I call passions to what follows: indignation, fear, shame, appetite and, in general, everything that goes in itself usually accompanied by pleasure or pain. And there is no qualification that corresponds to them, but there is regarding faculties. I call faculty that which by virtue of which those who act according to their passions are called according to them; for example, irascible, insensitive, loving, modest or shameless. The modes of being are the dispositions that cause what is in us, to be conforming or contradictory with reason, for example, courage, moderation, cowardice, intemperance (Aristotle, 2001a: 42).

Emotions, according to the Stagirite, lead to two types of components; the first, of a cognitive nature, such as what happens when they are

provoked by an offense that is judged as unfair or undeserved, either towards oneself or toward one of their own, in this type of circumstances, it is clearly shown the relationship of the emotion with reasoned argumentation. The second component is social, because it has a character of interpersonal relationship, which is characteristic of human beings in their social context; emotion is not conceived as a subjective feeling, and proof of them is the absence of moods such as loneliness or anguish (Paglialunga, 2016).

Aristotle in his *Magna Moralia*, refers to the things that must exist in the soul, indicating that they are the passions, faculties and habits; therefore, virtue (Garcés and Giraldo, 2012) will have to be one of them, Aristotle asserts:

Passions are anger, fear, hatred, anxiety, envy, pity and similar things, which often accompany pain and pleasure. Faculties, on the other hand, are the psychic realities by virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling those passions, like those in virtue of which we are capable of feeling anger, pain, compassion and similar feelings. Habits, for their part, are those psychic realities by virtue of which we have a good or bad attitude (Aristotle, 2011b: 147).

It is typical of habits to have a bad attitude; and having a good attitude towards them consists in not having the excess or the defect; in this way, if the habit is to have a good attitude (Garcés and Giraldo, 2013), this addresses to the middle term of those things that are praised; while the habit that is directed to bad attitudes, inclines towards excess or defect (Aristotle, 2011b). In addition, the *Nicomachean Ethics* clarifies the concrete issue that neither vices nor virtues are passions; this way Aristotle:

Therefore, neither virtues nor vices are passions, because we are not called good or bad by our passions, but by our virtues and our vices; and we are praised or censured not for our passions (since neither the one who is afraid nor the one who is angry is praised, nor the one who is angry for anything is censured, but the one who does it in a certain way), but for our virtues and vices. In addition, we get angry or fear without deliberate choice, while the virtues are a kind of choices, or are not acquired without choice. Finally, as far as the passions are concerned, they are said to move us, but as regards virtues and vices, it is said that they do not move us, but that they dispose us in a certain way (Aristotle, 2010a, p.60).

For the Stagirite, the character of a person can be defined as good or bad, for the fact of seeking or avoiding certain pleasures or pains; this becomes evident from the previous definition of passions, faculties and ways of being; the faculties and ways of being are in relation to the passions, and these are distinguished by pain and pleasure (Aristotle, 2011, and Garcés and Giraldo, 2014). Aristotle talks about pleasure and pain in the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

The study of pleasure and pain belongs to the political philosopher; he is the one who directs the end, looking towards what we call a good or bad thing in an absolute sense, we have placed ethical virtue and vice in relation to pains and pleasures; and most men think that happiness is accompanied by pleasure and, for this reason, they call a man (to be) 'happy' by deriving it from the verb "to enjoy." Now, some men think that no pleasure is a good either by itself or by accident, because they think that 'good' and 'pleasure' are not the same. Others think that some pleasures are good, but that most are bad. Still a third opinion holds that, although all pleasures are good, it is not possible, however, that the supreme good is pleasure. (Aristotle, 2010a: 207).

Speaking of happiness, let's remember that in Aristotle, living well and doing well, would be the same as being happy; besides that the only thing that makes us truly happy is virtue; for Matijasevic:

Happiness is an activity, a process, not a feeling in the mind, an emotion generated by the incessant turns of the vicissitudes of fortune; therefore, the truly happy man cannot be a chameleon who changes every time that circumstances alien to him modify his fortune situation (Matijasevic, 2011: 6).

This activity that is happiness for Aristotle is, without a doubt, a specifically human activity; and everything that attempts against it, it does it against human flowering (Schutz, 2007 and Garcés, 2014).

In *About the Soul*, Aristotle also speaks of the pleasant and painful of what is perceived by one of the senses (AA, 2011c, p.131), (Garcés and Murillo, 2016, p.8): "But when what is perceived is pleasant or painful, the sensitive faculty -as if in this way it were affirming it or denying it- pursues it or moves away from it." Konstan, speaking of pain in the thought of Aristotle (2004, p.49): "Pain, however, is not an emotion, it is as Aristotle says, a sensation (*aisthesis*). But our responses to pain

include emotional responses [...]” Aristotle, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, warns us about the things that happen in the soul and its relation to virtue (Aristotle, 2010a):

Since there are three things that happen in the soul, passions, faculties and ways of being, virtue must belong to one of them. I understand passions, appetite, anger, fear, anger, envy, joy, love, hate, desire, jealousy, compassion and, in general. Everything that goes accompanied by pleasure or pain. By faculties, those capacities by virtue of which we are said to be affected by these passions, for example, that for which we are capable of wrath, sadness or pity; and ways of being, that by virtue of which we behave well or badly with respect to the passions; for example, as to anger, we behave badly, if our attitude is excessive or weak; and well, if we act moderately; and the same with the others (Aristotle, 2010a: 59-60).

Emotions as an activity of the soul

For the Stagirite emotions are produced in the soul, and these are accompanied by pleasure and pain; this does not raise the question of the soul in connection with religious beliefs, but from a naturalistic perspective, it is installed in the explanation of the phenomenon of life; therefore, Dominguez states:

[..] In the realm of natural beings, there are living and non-living ones; between the former and the latter, there is a radical difference, an insurmountable ontological barrier; there must be, therefore, something that constitutes the root of those activities and functions that are exclusive to the living. This something -whatever it is- is called ‘soul’ by Aristotle (Dominguez, 2003: 663).

All the emotions that occur in the soul generate movement, therefore, if these things are produced in the soul, one could think according to Aristotle, that the soul moves. In his book *About the Soul*, Aristotle affirms:

Anyway, it would be more reasonable to ask if the soul moves in view of the following facts: we usually say that the soul is sad and happy, it is emboldened and frightened, and it also gets angry, feels and runs; now, all these things seem to be movements, then it could be concluded that the soul moves (Aristotle, 2010c: 57).

Aristotle continues in this same reflection of the soul saying that this does not necessarily follow

because even though human beings are sad, they rejoice or reason, and all these are fundamentally movements, and that each of these affections consists in being moved, and that this movement is produced by the soul; he concludes that it is man in function of the soul, he is the one who feels all these sufferings; for that reason, Aristotle affirms:

[...] For example, anger or fear is that the heart moves in such a way, run in the same way, and with respect to this body and with respect to any other and, finally, some of these conditions occur by virtue of the displacement of the organs moved; while others occur by virtue of an alteration of them (which and how, is another matter); so, stating with everything and with that that it is the soul who gets irritated, it would be something like affirming that it is the soul that weaves or build. It would be better, in fact, not to say that it is the soul that pities, learns or runs, but man in virtue of the soul. This does not mean, in any case, that the movement occurs in it, but sometimes ends in it and other originates in it: for example, the sensation originates in the corresponding objects, while evocation originates in the soul and ends in the movements or vestiges existing in the sensory organs (Aristotle, 2010c: 57).

Therefore, the soul is the means or the instrument that serves us, human beings, to do something or to feel something; this is how emotions, as movements that occur in the soul, sometimes develop up to the soul, and sometimes from that moment, which should not be understood as if the movement existed in the soul; these emotions occur together with the body, and the body suffers with all emotions. It can then be said that for Aristotle, emotions are not sensations that are exclusively psychic, but also somatic (of the body) (Dominguez, 2003). For this reason, Aristotle says:

The affections of the soul, on the other hand, present the difficulty of whether all of them are also common to the body that has a soul or if, on the contrary, there is one that is exclusive of the soul itself. Grasping this is, of course, necessary, but not easy at all. In most cases, you can see how the soul does not do or suffer anything without the body, for example, anger, embolden, desire; feeling in general (Aristotle, 2010c: 39).

Many of these sufferings to which Aristotle refers are introduced in several of his books, as is the case of *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemian* and *Magna Moralia*; in them, he affirms that they should be

considered in human beings as ways of being, pleasure and pain; this is the case of the *Eudemian Ethics* (Aristotle, 2011a, p.46): “The faculties and ways of being are in relation to emotions or passions, and these are distinguished by pain and pleasure [2].” Thus, the passions for the Stagirite are something that moves us, unlike the virtues or vices, which is something that prepares us to move in such a way, but does not get to move us; they are, therefore, intermediate places, between faculties and ways of being or habits (Conde, 2015).

This is how (Aristotle, 2010a, p 208): “[...] the pleasures prevent thinking, the more the greater the enjoyment, as in the case of sexual pleasures, because nobody could think anything during them [...] the reason that not all pleasures are good is: that there are pleasures that are shameful and objects of censure, and others that are harmful, because some pleasant things are harmful.” For Paglialunga (2016), referring to the emotions in Aristotle and their difference with grief and pleasure:

The revisions of Aristotle’s definitions of emotions have allowed, on the one hand, to emphasize 1) that they are not conceived as irrational, impulsive moods, but are based on beliefs or opinions that function as efficient causes; 2) that they are not subjective affections, but that they are always manifested as consequences of the activities that human beings perform within the framework of their social context; 3) the pain and/or pleasure that accompany them do not constitute “emotions,” but only pleasant or unpleasant sensations concomitant with them (Paglialunga, 2016: 151).

Aristotle continues by saying that not all the things that produce pleasure are bad, because it would be the same as affirming that healthy things are bad in relation to profit, so he states:

[...] because in this sense, both are bad, but they are not bad by virtue of that, since, sometimes, even contemplation is harmful to health. Neither is it a hindrance to thought or to any way of being the pleasure that derives from it, but those that are alien to it, because the pleasures of theoretical activity and learning make us theorize and learn more (Aristotle, 2010a, p. 210).

It is also necessary to reflect on the activities that produce goodness or badness:

Since the activities differ by their goodness or badness, and some are worthy of being sought, others avoided, and others indifferent, the same happens with pleasures, since each activity has its own pleasure. Thus, the pleasure that is proper to honest activity will be good; and the pleasure of bad, perverse; as well as the appetite of noble actions is praiseworthy, and of the shameful ones, reprehensible (Aristotle, 2010a: 283)

Pain is an evil and must be avoided, because in a sense, it is an obstacle; for this reason it cannot be affirmed that if pain is an evil, then pleasure is a good (Aristotle, 2010a, p 274):

[...] since one evil can oppose another evil, and both can oppose what is neither of them [...] if both were bad, both should be avoided, and if neither were bad, neither would be avoided, or it would equally be; but now it is evident that one is shunned as an evil, and the other is chosen as a good; and thus they are opposed to each other.” Men are evil because of pleasures and pains, for seeking and avoiding them; or as it should be, or it should not be (Aristotle, 2010a: 274).

In the matter of faculties and their relation with being good [3] or bad, Aristotle affirms:

For these reasons, they are not faculties either; since we are not called good or bad because we are simply capable of feeling the passions, nor are we praised or censured. Also, it is by nature how we have this ability, but we are not good or bad by nature (and we have spoken of this before). So, if the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, it only remains that they are modes of being. We have thus exposed the generic nature of virtue (Aristotle, 2010a: 60).

But virtue for Aristotle is that way of being by which man becomes good, and by which he performs his own function well; because every virtue brings to a conclusion the good disposition of that of which it is a virtue, and makes it to perform well its function [4]; it must be remembered that for Aristotle, virtue is the middle term between two vices, one by excess and the other by default; in addition, not every action or any passion admits the middle term (Aristotle, 2010a, p.63) (Garcés and Giraldo, 2014, p.210):

However, not every action or every passion admits the middle term, since there are some whose only name implies the idea of perversity;

for example, malignity, shamelessness, envy; and among actions, adultery, theft and murder. Since all these and similar things are so named because they are bad in themselves, not because of their excesses or their shortcomings.

For Conde (2015):

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, passion is treated from the point of view of something to be controlled by virtue; in *Eudemian Ethics*, he repeats this same point of view, when affirming that the ethical conduct is the result of a good conduction on the part of the reason of the desires and the passions (p.120).

This is how Aristotle is very interested in, and this is what is expressed in his treatises on ethics, the control of appetites and passions, in a reasoned and regulated manner, which undoubtedly it is given by virtue and its habits.

In addition, one of the writings where he develops this subject with more clarity is in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he relates directly the pleasures and pains with moral virtue [5], affirming:

It is necessary to consider as a sign of the ways of being, the pleasure or pain that accompanies the actions [...] the moral virtue [6]; in fact, it is related to the pleasures and pains, because we do the bad thing because of pleasure, and we turn away from good because of pain (Aristotle, 2010a: 56).

In addition, there are three provisions for Aristotle [7]: two vices, one for excess and one for defect, and one virtue, which is the middle term; Aristotle states:

[...] and all oppose each other in a certain way; because the extremes are contrary to the intermediate and each other, and the intermediate one is contrary to the extreme ones. For as the equal is greater in relation to the less and less in regard to the greater, so also in the passions and in the actions, the modes of being intermediate are excessive in regard to the deficient ones, and the deficient ones regarding the excessive ones (Aristotle, 2010a: 68).

Virtue is the middle term of such passions, and passions are either pains or pleasures, or at least they are not given without pain or pleasure; it is, therefore, that virtue has to do with pains and pleasures (Aristotle, 2011b, p. 148); in the same

way, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, the following speaks, Aristotle (2010a) says:

Furthermore, if virtues are related to actions and passions, and pleasure and pain accompany all passion, then for this reason also virtue will be related to pleasures and pains. In addition, as we have said before, every way of being of the soul has a nature that is implied and related to those things for which it is naturally worse or better; and men become evil because of pleasures and pains, for persecuting or avoiding them, or those that are not allowed, or when they should not, or as they should not, or in any other way that can be determined by reason in this matter (Aristotle, 2010a: 56).

As it has been shown for Aristotle, virtue refers to passions and actions, some of which are voluntary and others involuntary; the volunteer ones are the object of praise or reproach, the involuntary ones are of indulgence and generate compassion. Involuntary things are those that are made by force and ignorance; they are forced on people and their principle is external and in them, neither the agent nor the patient participate; whereas the volunteer ones are in particular actions of each one of the people; that is, they are those whose principle is in the same agent who knows the circumstances in which the action lies (Aristotle, 2010a, pp. 72-74).

In addition, pleasure is directly related to activity and the senses, since pleasure arises with respect to all sensation and the liking of these; and these sensations are more pleasant when the sense is more excellent and is directed to a similar object, and the sensation that is discovered between the one who feels it and what is felt, there will always be pleasure; in this way, Aristotle argues:

Pleasure perfects activity, not as a disposition that resides in the agent, but as an end that survives as the flower of life at the right age. Therefore, as long as the object that is thought or felt is as it should be, and it is; equally, the faculty that judges or contemplates, there will be pleasure in the activity (Aristotle, 2010a: 280).

In addition, men aspire to pleasure, because it is related to life, and everyone wants to live; because life is a kind of activity and each person directs their activities towards the things that are their predilection; but also, “[...] pleasure perfects the activities, as well as the living, that everyone wants; it is reasonable, then, that they also aspire to

pleasure, since they perfect the life that each one has chosen [...]; without activity, there is no pleasure, and pleasure perfects all activity (Aristotle, 2010a, p.281).” In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, it is left in evidence the relation that exists between the pleasure and the activity in life; Aristotle affirms:

This might also seem to be deduced from the fact that every pleasure lies in the activity that perfects. In effect, each activity is increased with the pleasure that is proper to it, and, thus, those who exercise with pleasure in things judge better and speak more accurately of them [...] Thus, pleasures intensify activities that are their own; but specifically different activities must correspond to specifically different pleasures (Aristotle, 2010a: 282).

This is how activities can be hindered by the pleasures of other activities [8]; the most pleasant one expels the other and gets increased much more, when both differ in pleasure; because when we really enjoy something, we do not do anything else in the same spirit. It is said that goodness is pleasure; but others contradict it and affirm that pleasure is all bad; because (by) representing pleasure in this way, it is thought that it could have a better effect for our life, by the fact that it is judged that most men are inclined toward pleasures and are slaves to them; Aristotle insists that this may be said for no reason:

But, perhaps, this is said without reason, because the arguments relating to passions and actions are less convincing than the facts; and so, when they disagree with what they perceive by the senses, they are despised and discredit the truth. In fact, the one who censures pleasure, but sometimes is inclined to it, gives the impression that is always carried away by it, since it is not proper for the vulgar to know how to distinguish (Aristotle, 2010a: 272).

This is why all the study of virtue and politics in Aristotle is related to pleasures and pains; whoever makes good use of them will be good, and whoever does the opposite will be bad. Thus, virtue refers to the pleasures and pains and grow by the same actions that produce them and is exercised by the same things that gave rise to it (Aristotle, 2010a, p 58). The subject of pleasures and pains is addressed by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle, 2010a, p.207-208):

[...] Pleasures are not at all something good, because all pleasure is a perceptible generation

towards a nature, and no generation is of the same genre as the ends, as the building is not of the same gender as the building. In addition, the moderate man rejects the pleasures, and the prudent one pursues what is free of pain, not what is pleasant (Aristotle, 2010a: 207-208).

Returning to the main topic that concerns us, that of emotions, Paglialuna (2016) makes an analysis of the meaning of these from the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle and its relationship with the establishment of links in society:

All the analysis of emotions in the *Rhetoric* shows that the circulation or exchange of goods and, therefore personal relationships, are inscribed within the acceptance of a code of justice, honor, “good manners,” which may consist of written rules, but more frequently they are *Ágrapha*, behavioral behavior mostly shared, whose ultimate instance is the society within which human beings establish their links (Paglialuna 2016: 138).

Having defined the emotions for Aristotle, and their relationship with the passions, joys and sorrows, it is important to know the kinds of emotions that the Stagirite has defined, with a description for each one of them. We will deal with this in the next section.

Classes of emotions in Aristotle

From the Aristotelian thought, there are a series of emotions, which he has developed throughout his corpus; there are also opposites for these ones, which are important to review:

Emotions and their opposites

Anger and calm

Anger, it seems, partly hears the reason, but does not listen to it; as well as the hasty servants, who, before hearing everything that is said to them, run away, and then they carry out the order badly; and also like the dogs that bark when they hear the door, before seeing if it is a friend; Aristotle says (Aristotle, 2010a, p.196-197): “[...] anger hears, but, because of the heat and its precipitate nature, does not listen to what is ordered, and revenge is launched. The reason in effect or the imagination indicate to her that an outrage or a contempt is made to her; and she, like concluding that she must do it, fights against this, to the point it irritates.” As it has been said, the wrathful one is accompanied by a certain pleasure, because he also occupies his

time thinking about revenge; everything that you imagine of this, generates a pleasure similar to that which you feel when you dream (Aristotle, 2010b, page 699).

The opposite of anger is calm; and this is defined in *Rhetoric* (Aristotle, 2010b, p.705) this way: “[...] Calm is an appeasement and pacification of anger; in this case, if men get angry with those who despise them and contempt is voluntary, it is evident that with those who do not do any of this, or do it or seem to do it involuntarily, it remains calm.” It also generates calm against those who acknowledge their faults and ask for forgiveness, because they stop the anger, for the fact of having felt the discomfort that is generated by what they have done; calm is felt before those who present themselves to us as humble; with it, they show that they feel fear and nobody who fears, makes contempt; in the same way the anger ceases in front of those who are not arrogant, mocking or disdainful towards anyone; nor with good people (Aristotle, 2010b, p.707).

Love and hate

For Aristotle, love is the will to love someone who is thought to be good; he is a friend who loves and, in turn, is loved, because friends must be mutually in this disposition; the friend is the one who rejoices with the goods of his friend, and is saddened by his sorrows; thus: (Aristotle, 2010b, pp. 710-711): “Because, certainly, we all rejoice when there happen the things we want, just as we feel regret when the contrary occur, so that both sorrows and pleasures are signs of will. Therefore, friends are those who have the same things for good or bad, and for friends and enemies to the same people, because it is necessary to want for friends the same as for oneself, so that the one who wants the same for himself that for others, shows to them that he is their friend.”

We must talk about enmity and hatred; because these are the opposites of friendship. The causes that produce enmity are: anger, vexation and suspicion; although there is a difference between anger and enmity; anger comes from the things that affect oneself, while enmity can develop without any personal reason for the fact of supposing that one is of a certain condition, it can be generated in enmity towards others. Anger always refers to something taken in the individual sense (Aristotle, 2010b, p.714).

Fear and trust

For Aristotle, fear is an emotion that occurs in the soul, as we have stated; who flees from everything and fears everything and cannot stand anything, is a coward; but on the contrary, it happens that who does not fear anything and throws himself away to everything, becomes a reckless person, someone who is overconfident in the face of fear (Domínguez, 2003, page 664). Fearful things are feared, those that produce evils; that is why fear is understood as the expectation of evil; those things that are feared are infamy, poverty, illness, lack of friends, death; the brave fears these things, because not doing so is considered shameful; for example, to infamy, the one who fears it is honest and decent, not to fear them is shameless (Aristotle, 2010a, pp. 87-88).

Aristotle defines trust as the opposite of fear, and defines it as a hope accompanied by a fantasy that those things that can save us are about to happen; and on the contrary, those that cause us fear are distant; thus (Aristotle, 2010b, p.720): “It gives confidence, therefore, that misfortunes are far away and means of salvation are nearby, that remedies exist and resources are available, whether they are abundant, or large, or both; not having been victim of injustice nor having committed it, not having in general antagonists or the fact that they do not have the capacity to harm us, or in case they have it, they are friends or they have made some benefit to us, or have received them from us.” There are some provisions that favor trust in people, such as those who have triumphed on many occasions and have not suffered any harm; also those who have been on the edge of misfortune and have escaped it; when the fearsome is not that for those who are our equals, or our inferiors, or people of whom we consider ourselves superior; those who believe they have more and better means such as the abundance of money, physical strength, friends, property; likewise, those who have not committed injustice against anyone, or against those who inspire fear (Aristotle, 2010b, p.721).

Shame and shamelessness

Shame is a certain sorrow or embarrassment that is relative to current vices, past or future ones, whose existence and practice brings with it a loss in reputation; and shamelessness is contempt or insensitivity to the same vices; therefore they shame all the vices that are shameful, either for

oneself or for those closest to them; some things that can lead to shame are: cowardice, injustice, debauchery, ruinous or shameful profits, greed and pettiness, begging, praise, lack of success; in addition, it is also a sign of shame the flattery that is done to others (Aristotle, 2010b, pp. 723-724): “[...] praising someone who is present, overestimating their merits as well as diminishing their defects, exceeding in condolences with whoever hurts before us, and other similar things: in effect, all this is a sign of adulation. “

There is a relationship between modesty and shame; this, for Aristotle, is the middle ground between shamelessness and shyness (Aristotle, 2011b, p.168). Modesty for Aristotle is not a virtue, it is more like a passion; it is a kind of fear of loss of prestige and is equivalent to something similar to fear of danger; both seem to be corporal affections, it seems more typical of passion than of the way of being. If you feel ashamed of wrongdoing, you should not commit it. To perform a shameful action is proper to a bad man. Modesty accompanies voluntary actions, and a distinguished man never commits shameful actions (Aristotle, 2010a, pp. 128-129). Who does not consider the opinion of anybody is shameless, but who equally pays attention to everybody is timid, and who considers the opinion of good people is reserved (Aristotle, 2011a, p.87). In *Magna Moralia*, it is said that (Aristotle, 2011b, pp. 168-169): “[...] Who has to do with actions and words [...] will not say or do anything at any time (like the shameless one), nor will he avoid doing it completely and on all occasions (like the timid one), but he will do what is convenient, where it is convenient and when it is convenient.”

Compassion and outrage

Someone is compassionate if it is estimated that there are honest people to feel this passion or emotion, because not all people suffer damage that can cause compassion for them; in addition, when it is remembered that things of the same nature have happened to oneself or to the ones close to him, or that they may happen to them (Aristotle, 2010b, p.734). For Campeggiani (2014, page 189): “The emotion of compassion shows an aptitude to share the suffering of others, when this suffering is undeserved”; this is usually characterized by a pain on the part of the one who perceives an injustice in the other.

The opposite of compassion is indignation; this is produced or is similar to the sorrow that is experienced by the ills or misfortunes of other people, and much more if they are undeserved; this emotion or passion is very similar to what is felt by the undeserved successes of others. For Aristotle, both passions are proper to honest people, because it is so typical of the good, to feel sad and compassionate for those who suffer an evil without deserving it, as outrage against those who are undeservedly happy (Aristotle, 2010b, p. 738). Compassion is felt in the face of undeserved misfortunes, while we are indignant at an undeserved fate; both the compassion and the indignation are characteristic of people with an honest character, because they are the opposition that is exercised in front of an injustice (Campeggiani, 2014).

Envy and emulation

Envy consists in a certain sorrow felt by our peers for their notorious success in reaching goods; they are those people who are equal in lineage, kinship, age, way of being, fame or economic means. In addition, Aristotle defines the envious person in the following way (Aristotle, 2010b, p.744): “[...] those who are close to have everything are envious (which is why those who do great things and the fortunate ones are more envious), since they think that everyone wants to take away what is theirs, as well as those who enjoy an outstanding reputation for something, and especially in wisdom or happiness, as those who aspire to honors are more envious than those who do not desire them, and the wise only in appearance, since they aspire to what concerns wisdom.”

It is necessary to talk in this section about emulation; because this, as defined by Aristotle, is a certain sorrow that is felt by those people who count on honorable goods and who consider themselves to be the ones who are able to get them, in rivalry with those who we believe are equal to us; the Stagirite elaborates and proposes a differentiation between emulation and envy (Aristotle, 2010b, p.747-748): “[...] emulation is proper to honest men, while envy is immoral and proper to the immoral ones; since through emulation, the ones are prepared to achieve the goods; the others, instead, look with envy that the neighbor does not get them; it is then necessary that those who consider themselves deserving of goods that they do not possess are

prone to emulation, but that it would be possible for them to obtain, since nobody aspires to what is shown as impossible.”

Conclusions

For the Stagirite, emotions are produced in the soul, and these are accompanied by pleasure and pain; when produced in the soul, they generate movement; therefore, according to Aristotle, the soul moves; that is, all the emotions that occur in it generate movement; hence, for Aristotle, it is man in function of the soul who feels all these sufferings, who feels all the emotions that are accompanied by pleasure and pain according to the state of the mind that a person may have.

For the Stagirite, the affections of the soul occur with the body: courage, sweetness, fear, compassion, boldness, joy, love and hatred; this is how the body is affected along with the soul, with all the previous affections; for that reason, he affirms:

This is evidenced by the fact that sometimes there is no anger or terror, no matter how violent and palpable the conditions are, while at other times the commotion takes place under the influence of small and imperceptible affections -for example, when the body is excited and in a situation similar to when one is angered (Aristotle, 2010c: 40).

Footer

[1] Grief and pleasure are not emotions, but their components.

[2] The reason for this is stated in the *Ethics of Edema*, in the following way: “Therefore, all men spontaneously define virtues as impassivity or serenity with regard to pleasures and pains, and vices, for opposite relations. (Aristotle, 2011a, p.46):”

[3] In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the Stagirite says: “For them, it is a difficult task to be good, because in all things, it is hard to find the means, for example: speaking the center of the circle is not feasible for everyone, but for the one who knows, as well as getting irritated. Giving money and spending are within the reach of anyone, and it is easy; but giving it to who should be given and in the quantity and at the right time and for the reason and in the right way, not all the world can do it, and it is not easy; that’s why good is rare, praiseworthy and beautiful (Aristotle, 2010a, p.68).”

[4] Aristotle clarifies this with an example (Aristotle, 2010a, p.61): “For example, the virtue of the eye makes the eye and its function good (since we see by the virtue of the eye); in the same way, the virtue of the horse makes it good and useful for running and taking the rider to face his enemies.”

[5] Virtue is the disposition that results from the best movements of the soul, and is also the source of the best actions and passions of this (Aristotle, 2011a, p 40-41). “It is, therefore, that way of being that makes us capable of performing the best acts and that disposes us (in) the best possible way to a better good or act, which is consistent with the right reason (Aristotle, 2011a, pp. 46-47). In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defines virtue as: “... an elective habit consisting of a middle term relative to us, regulated by the right reason in the way that a truly prudent man would regulate it. It is a means between two vices, one by excess and one by default; and also by not reaching in one case, and by surpassing in another; necessary in the passions and actions, while virtue finds and chooses the middle term. Therefore, according to its entity and the definition that establishes its essence, virtue is a middle term, but with respect to the best and the good, it is an extreme (Aristotle, 2010a, p.63).”

[6] It is called in this way because it is the fruit of habit.

[7] For Aristotle: “[...] there is a mutual disposition between these three modes of being, the opposition between the extremes is greater than with respect to the medium, since they are further away from each other than from the middle; for example, the large is more distant from the small and the small from the large, than both from the equal; and in some cases, one of the extremes seems to be similar to the medium, like recklessness and courage [...] but, as opposites are defined as the things that are most distant from each other, equally those that are most distant are more opposed (Aristotle, 2010a, p.69).”

[8] Aristotle explains this with the following example (Aristotle, 2010a, p.282): “Thus, flute aficionados are unable to pay attention to a conversation when they listen attentively to a flute player, because they enjoy listening to the flute rather than listening to the conversation; and in this way, the pleasure of the flute destroys the activity of the conversation.”

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