Sundown of the Constitutional Court: validity of the Political Constitution at the discretion of the Executive Branch

Abstract

The article presents concepts of the Political Constitution and its reform and revision components, as well as Democratic Constitutionalism. It reflects on the political responsibility of the Constitutional Courts, addresses the legal and political crossroads regarding the nomination and election of the Constitutional Court, and concludes that the Western design seems to be correct when all the Powers intervene. Subsequently, the current role of the magistrates of the Constitutional Court in the control of the constitutionality of the acts reforming the Constitution is questioned, regarding the suspected incompetence of the Congress of the Republic to do so in what it has designated as “competition vices†and “substitution of the Constitutionâ€. The judgments of the Court on Legislative Acts 2 of 2015 and 1 of 2016 and of the Council of State are critically addressed, in their residual competence of constitutionality control. The fast track is questioned as a mechanism for all kinds of legal and constitutional reforms incorporated in Legislative Act 01 of 2016 and approved by the Constitutional Court. Complementarily, the limits established by the Constitutional Court to implement the Peace Agreement through the ‘fast track’ in Ruling C-160 of March 9, 2017 are referred to. Finally, the work refers to the academic discussion that Constitutional Court rulings are political, but not politicized.